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INTRODUCTION 
Parameters that define the family have shifted for millennia. Originally, 
family was premised upon kinship, tribal connections, and household com-
position; or, as society progressed, a legal status acquired through adoption. 
The earliest families established a form structure, which entitled those with-
in the form to defined rights over property distribution, the raising of chil-
dren, and decision-making authority. Some of these early family forms were 
ratified through references in centuries-old religious texts. In geographical 
areas where the population assimilated these religious texts, form families 
became the norm in the fabric of society. Gradually, the norm warranted 
common law and statutory protection and preeminence. The religious and 
legal norm remained the standard of what constituted family as society pro-
gressed into the modern age. As Professor Harold Berman aptly summa-
rized, “[s]ixty to seventy years ago, the connection between law and religion 
in the West was so intimate that it was usually taken for granted.”1 
In addition to form families, parallel family structures have always ex-
isted. These families are based more upon function than form, deriving their 
status as a family from the subjective intent of adult members seeking to 
share property, a household, or intimacies. These function families, if they 
lacked the blood, marriage, or adoption elements of form families, were 
denied the same protected legal status as form families. Most often, they 
  
 1. Harold J. Berman, Religious Foundations of Law in the West: An Historical Per-
spective, 1 J.L. & RELIGION 3 (1983). 
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suffered legal sanctions. Thus, unmarried, nonrelated adults sharing proper-
ty, a common household, and intimacies were almost always deprived of 
inheritance, support, and often paternity rights. As a result, the economic 
and parenting consequences of these functioning relationships were ex-
tremely adverse. However, little thought was given to the disparity between 
the protections afforded form families and the lack of such protections for 
function families. Most commentators thought that disparity resulted from 
personal choice. The rationale was that adults formed function families 
through personal choice, and because establishing a form family was an 
available option, any disparity in legal protections arose from personal 
choices freely made. If adversity ensued, participants had no one to blame 
but themselves. Furthermore, if a particular choice was not available to adult 
parties, it was not due to discrimination, but rather to the nature of the 
choice itself. Thus, same-sex marriage, incestuous marriage, polygamy, and 
parental rights without a genetic or statutory basis were unavailable choices 
because of the definition of marriage or parenthood. The definition of the 
right sought precluded the choice—not society and not the law. 
The laws pertaining to family structure existent in the colonial territo-
ries of America were always pluralistic. Colonists from countries like Eng-
land, Holland, France, and Spain did not inexorably maintain the law of the 
country from which each emigrated. “Instead, . . . the early settlers crafted 
the law of each new colony in a distinctive fashion designed to give effect to 
the specific goals that had induced settlement . . . . What [the colonists] 
shared in common was a willingness to alter received legal doctrine to suit 
their needs and purposes . . . .”2 Because many of the settlers came to Amer-
ica to escape religious persecution and to freely practice their own religious 
beliefs, their religious doctrines often formulated common law, statutes, and 
practice. Therefore, as Professor Berman observes, many of the laws and 
practices of early America were firmly rooted in biblical language. This 
language formed the basis of definitions, rights, and responsibilities applica-
ble to divorce, marriage, adoption, and parentage. Professor Berman, refer-
encing Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, opines that for 
centuries, law was viewed as “a product of overlapping histories—the histo-
ry of Christianity and Judaism, the history of Greece, the history of Rome, 
the history of the church, local history, national history, international histo-
ry, and more.”3 All of these parameters, he suggests, served to reveal “the 
providential character of law as part of a divine plan.”4 Among many Amer-
  
 2. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 879 (2009) (quoting WILLIAM E. NELSON, 
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON 
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1780–1830, at ix–xii (1994)). 
 3. Berman, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 4. Id. at 5. 
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icans today, there remains the notion that law represents a divine plan, a 
world view, and an immutable natural order to things. 
Throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, the concept 
of law as immutable and divinely ordered was explicitly challenged.  The 
challenges occurred at two levels: first, at the public level, through both civil 
and criminal litigation; and second, on a private level, through the actions 
taken by individuals manifesting a newly discovered reality that people 
could private-order their choices, independent of form or structure. At the 
public level, beginning with divorce, then proceeding to marriage, adoption, 
and finally to non-coital parentage, litigants in functioning families used 
newly discovered federal and state constitutional guarantees to successfully 
override centuries of precedent. No-fault divorce proliferated; same-sex 
marriage evolved from nonmarital cohabitation and newly established status 
arrangements similar to marriage; assisted reproductive technology permit-
ted parentage independent of marriage, sexual intercourse, and genetic con-
nection; single persons, unmarried cohabitants, and same-sex couples could 
adopt children freely. Over a few decades, on both the public and private 
levels, the immutable and divinely ordered family law structure in America 
was challenged and as a consequence, underwent radical change. 
Specifically, at the private level, increasing numbers of individual 
adults spurned form families. Instead, they demonstrated a preference to 
private-order their lives in order to maximize choices and expand opportuni-
ties. The possibility of private-order choices was born in Griswold’s right to 
marital privacy,5 then nurtured by Eisenstadt’s individual’s right to be let 
alone,6 Roe’s personal choice to end a pregnancy,7 and Lawrence’s liberty 
interest protecting intimacies among consenting adults.8 These seminal deci-
sions abound in family law litigation. Arguably, private-ordering among 
adults is the engine challenging family law structures today. Private-
ordering is not a gay and lesbian movement or a product of increasing secu-
larization. Rather, private-ordering is about private ordering. As Professor 
Paul Horwitz writes, “the liberal consensus, for both religious and secular 
reasons, is pervaded by a highly individualistic worldview.”9 
Successful challenges to family law structures at the public and private 
levels have precipitated a concerted reaction from persons and organizations 
with sincerely held religious beliefs. For these religious advocates, the de-
bate is about a worldview based on religious beliefs and contexts that evi-
dence a divine plan; individual creeds are not as significant as a shared 
  
 5. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 6. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 8. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 9. PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 15 
(2011). 
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worldview that must be maintained. Among adherents of this worldview, 
issues such as the definition of marriage, the purpose of human sexuality, 
the unique integrity of the human body, and the importance of human life 
are not decided at the individual level, but rather involve questions of fun-
damental religious truth. Private-ordering, no matter how well-grounded in 
civil rights and recent constitutional precedent, is not qualified to challenge 
a worldview based upon scripture, history, and practice. Adherents to this 
worldview can claim many successful interventions in secular life. “Reli-
gious faith has provided the impetus for so many of the movements for civic 
reform and renewal in the United States: the abolitionist movement, which 
worked for the eradication of slavery; the labor movement; the child-welfare 
movement; the civil-rights movement; the peace movement(s); the pro-life 
movement.”10 It is because of these formidable accomplishments, plus the 
fervent evangelical religious beliefs of many Americans that many persons 
and organizations have resolved to preserve traditional forms of family 
structure generally, resisting the impetus of private-ordering and instead 
protecting religious liberty specifically. These adherents rally behind a 
worldview dependent on religious texts, history, and an immutable natural 
law. 
This Article argues that challenges made to family law structures have 
provoked a significant reaction from persons and religious organizations 
advocating a distinctive worldview based on religious and historical values. 
Additionally, as family law changes from being a product of a religious-
historical worldview to being a product of private-ordering, the religious 
liberty of worldview adherents has been challenged. The struggle is apparent 
in the debates during the 2012 presidential election and is evidenced in gov-
ernment mandates that include, among other requirements, that employers—
including religious organizations—provide insurance coverage for employ-
ees that include contraception. Although many aspects of family law have 
been challenged by private-ordering, this Article will focus on four devel-
opments: divorce, marriage, adoption, and parentage. When addressing each 
of these, this Article will analyze the progression from what had been the 
standard for centuries, and then the challenges made by private-ordering. 
Then this Article will analyze the reaction to this challenge by worldview 
adherents. 
Part I of this Article discusses the impact of private-ordering upon fam-
ily law structures. Changes in family law, particularly as they affect what 
had heretofore been considered immutable characteristics of form families, 
occur at a unique cultural time. Citizens have become increasingly plural-
istic. There are many religious traditions, and there are certainly many per-
  
 10. DONALD WUERL, SEEK FIRST THE KINGDOM: CHALLENGING THE CULTURE BY LIVING 
OUR CATHOLIC FAITH 62 (2012). 
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sons with no religious tradition at all. The Internet, with its multifaceted 
connections, provides family, affirmation, and faith. Indeed, as one com-
mentator wrote: “[I]t is now possible to imagine life without religious belief 
at all.”11 Stripped of its religious underpinnings, history becomes less rele-
vant and natural law unobservable. The focus is now on private-ordering. 
America’s penchant for private-ordering suggests that it may be impossible 
to place the genie back into the bottle. It may be impossible to recreate or 
maintain a worldview without private-ordering, with hierarchy, without the 
preeminence of conscience. 
Part II of this Article analyzes the changes that have occurred in di-
vorce. The indissolubility of marriage, a bulwark of the religious worldview, 
has dissipated since the advent of no-fault divorce. States adopted the prac-
tice whereby either spouse could obtain a divorce regardless of fault with 
alacrity. From the start, worldview adherents were adamantly opposed to 
divorce because of the historical and religious uniqueness of marriage; how-
ever, divorce remains easy to obtain. Indeed, divorce is becoming inconse-
quential as the number of persons in nonmarital cohabitation increases. Yet, 
no-fault divorce forms the bedrock upon which subsequent challenges to 
family law rest. 
Part III of this Article analyzes the changes that have occurred in mar-
riage. An increasing number of couples choose to enter into nonmarital co-
habitation rather than marry at all, and a significant number of persons re-
main single. But marriage and the commitment it entails epitomizes a 
worldview built upon religion and historical practice, operating as it does 
under defined terms and defined obligations. For those whose worldview 
encompasses a definition of marriage as being of one man and one woman, 
the changes making marriage available to persons of the same-sex have been 
catastrophic. In addition, many states provide the unique benefits of mar-
riage to persons living in alternative status arrangements such as domestic 
partnerships, reciprocal beneficiaries, and civil unions. Worldview adherents 
reject marriage alternatives and same-sex marriage because they ignore the 
unique function of marriage: sexual intercourse in the context of natural law 
fecundity. 
Part IV of this Article analyzes the changes that have occurred with 
adoption. Traditionally, adoption is solely a statutory creation. With the ex-
ception of equitable adoption—which really is not adoption at all, but rather 
a means by which equity might be done so as to allow a child to inherit an 
intestate estate from a caretaker adult—adoption remains a creation of stat-
ute. The modern challenge arises from the introduction of statutes that allow 
single persons, same-sex couples, and unmarried persons to adopt children. 
These statutes provide the appearance of procreation without the prerequi-
  
 11. Horwitz, supra note 9, at xiv. 
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site of marriage within the historical and religious parameters of worldview 
adherents. Today, there are multiple examples of adoption by same-sex cou-
ples, single persons and nonmarital cohabitants. Furthermore, once an adop-
tion is finalized in one state, it is entitled to Full Faith and Credit in all other 
states. States with a public policy favoring a worldview that limits marriage 
and procreation to form families are powerless to deny recognition. 
Part V of this Article analyzes the changes that have occurred in par-
entage. Through scientific developments in assisted reproductive technolo-
gy, it is possible for individuals and couples to conceive children through 
multiple means. Parentage may occur without the necessity of genetic con-
nection, after the death of the gamete providers, and through gestational 
agreements premised upon mutual consent and a written contract. Moral and 
ethical issues surrounding these increasing technological achievements in-
clude the destroying of human embryos, disposing of embryos upon dissolu-
tion of any relationship, and cloning. However, while persons and organiza-
tions commit to providing additional opportunities to persons and couples in 
pursuit of self-ordering, worldview adherents view the process of assisted 
reproductive technology as a grave distortion of sexual intercourse in the 
context of marriage. Sexual intercourse within marriage is essential to 
worldview adherents, and when challenges are made to its importance, both 
through mimicry and through state action that mandates contraceptive cov-
erage, worldview adherents react strongly. Litigation, commentary, and 
statutory initiatives surrounding mandated contraceptive insurance coverage 
is an example. Yet, the real controversy exists over self-ordering persons 
challenging worldview adherents in the context of family law issues. Be-
cause the worldview relies upon religious texts and convictions, this precipi-
tates a challenge to religious liberty.  
I. PRIVATE-ORDERING VERSUS A WORLDVIEW 
American culture has evolved into one that fosters private-ordering. 
“[T]he institutional and culture climates of America abundantly reinforce 
languages of an unencumbered self: choice, self-interest, personal happi-
ness, and pleasure. Contexts that reinforce values of service, long-term 
commitment, and sharing are often submerged, relative to those emphasiz-
ing gratification.”12 While sounding hedonistic, in application, private-
ordering is tempered by self-imposed restraints and the legal and social re-
strictions of the culture itself. But even in this encumbered condition, pri-
vate-ordering is the engine that guides increasing numbers of Americans 
  
 12. John A. Coleman, The Common Good and Catholic Social Thought, in AMERICAN 
CATHOLICS AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: A DISTINCTIVE VOICE 10 (Margaret O’Brien Steinfels 
ed., 2004). 
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living their individual lives. In contrast, there are many Americans who are 
convinced that there is a worldview, often structured by scriptural refer-
ences; sometimes by commonly shared ideals and history; and in a few in-
stances, by political ideologies. Not surprisingly, there are often clashes 
between those persons expressing their private-ordered choices and persons 
seeking to maintain an immutable worldview. 
Within American civil law there is a clash. On the one hand, there are 
those persons seeking to readily divorce, marry whom they please, adopt 
children without restraint, and procreate commensurate with the latest tech-
nological advancements. On the other hand, there are those persons who 
maintain a worldview that views marriage as indissoluble and between per-
sons of the opposite sex, adoption as reserved to persons representative of 
their worldview, and procreation as restrained by the importance of the sex-
ual intercourse within marriage. Beginning in the second half of the last 
century, an increasing number of laws were enacted, judicial opinions is-
sued, and private decisions made that openly confronted the traditional 
worldview. This movement is perceived as a challenge to religious persons 
and organizations. Previously, these persons and organizations could be 
exempted from the application of these challenging laws through heighted 
judicial scrutiny or through statutory accommodation exemptions. But to-
day, these protections have evaporated, been inadequate, or been otherwise 
denied. Faced with continuing challenges to the religious worldview, per-
sons and organizations are forced to enter the political arena to avoid the 
consequences of these challenges. Yet, there are difficulties in motivating 
religious adherents because they too have been affected by the cultural phe-
nomenon of private-ordering, preferring to vote and lobby individually. 
If family law challenges are fueled by private-ordering, which this Ar-
ticle argues is the case, how did private-ordering come to be such a formi-
dable force? Three principal factors have contributed to private-ordering’s 
ability to challenge a worldview that had dominated American civil life 
from the time of the Colonies. First, the perspective of family law has shift-
ed from local to international concerns. Second, the protective judicial scru-
tiny and statutory accommodation devices that shielded the religious 
worldview from the intrusion of civil law have been eliminated. Finally, the 
religious congregations have been affected by the private-ordering of their 
congregants, thus lessening the political clout that these organizations once 
wielded. Increasingly, a well-educated congregation of adherents relies upon 
individual conscience without hierarchical or dogma restraints. However, 
conscience is often the rationale behind self-ordering. 
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A. Evolution of Family Law 
In 1858, the United States Supreme Court disclaimed any jurisdiction 
to decide divorce cases or to address the attendant alimony issues.13 In so 
doing, the Court established what is known as the domestic relations excep-
tion to federal jurisdiction, making family law an area that “has been left to 
the States from time immemorial and not without good reason.”14 The rea-
son that federal courts abstained from state family law disputes was simple: 
local communities were better able to decide cases based on community 
mores, and to apply “creative responses to vexing problems.”15 However, 
the village has now become the global community, and the emphasis on 
local family law has waned precipitously.  
The first significant challenge to local family law came with the 1878 
decision of the United States Supreme Court permitting a state to outlaw 
polygamy, in spite of the sincerely held religious beliefs of the polygamist.16 
The decision promulgated the distinction often cited in support of the sepa-
ration of church and state today: “Laws are made for the government of ac-
tions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opin-
ions, they may with practices.”17 One hundred years later, a series of Su-
preme Court decisions would overturn many state statutes that sought to 
prohibit sodomy and abortion, restrict access to birth control devices, and 
prohibit nonmarital cohabitation.18 These decisions signaled that family law 
was no longer a local matter; family law became increasingly subject to 
federal courts and to federal constitutional decisions—and, as time pro-
gressed, to state courts and state constitutional decisions. 
Federal statutes quickly accompanied federal court rulings. For exam-
ple, in 1978 Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act,19 thereby re-
stricting all state court custody decisions concerning Native American   
children. In an effort to protect Native American culture and traditions, con-
trol over children was given to the Native American tribes. Congress   en-
  
 13. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 
U.S. 689, 697–98 (1992) (holding that the exception to federal jurisdiction is grounded in the 
power of Congress to grant jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution). 
 14. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 15. Id. at 791. 
 16. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 17. Id. at 166. 
 18. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing a federal right to 
privacy for married couples); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (banning state 
sodomy statutes as violating the liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (banning state laws prohibiting abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438 (1972) (extending the federal right to privacy to single persons).  
 19. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1934 (2006). 
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acted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act in 1980,20 the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act in 1988,21 and the International Parental 
Kidnapping Crime Act in 1993.22 These federal statutes affirmed the nation-
al character of child custody determinations. Federal statutes were also en-
acted to establish regulations for child support, such as the Child Support 
Recovery Act of 1992,23 and various other federal statutes either comple-
mented or replaced existing state laws—examples include the protection of 
the worldview definition of marriage through the Defense of Marriage Act 
of 199624 and the protection of battered and abused women with the Vio-
lence Against Women Act.25 A ban on partial-birth abortion was codified 
through the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 200326 and then subsequently 
held to be constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 2007.27 
While the federal judiciary and Congress were becoming more active 
in their pursuit of transforming family law into a national concern, non-
governmental groups were proposing uniform laws for adoption by the 
states. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and academic groups such as the American Law Institute drafted laws that, 
if adopted by the individual states, would make uniform many of the family 
laws proposed. Gradually, states enacted many of the laws in whole or in 
part. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, first promulgated in the early 
1970s, became the model for many states.28 Additionally, the Uniform Par-
entage Act,29 the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act,30 
and the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act31 became models for many state 
statutes. Two uniform acts were considered so essential to national enforce-
ment that Congress mandated that they be adopted by the states prior to the 
state obtaining federal funding: the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
  
 20. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6–10, 94 Stat. 
3566 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 21. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2006). 
 22. International Parental Kidnapping Act of 1993, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1204 (2006).  
 23. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 24. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 25. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001–40703, 108 
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 26. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
 27. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 28. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 101–506 (amended 1973), 9A Part I U.L.A. 171 
(1998) through 9A Part II U.L.A. 549 (1998). 
 29. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 101–905 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 295–372 (2001). 
 30. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT §§ 1–16, 9C U.L.A. 368–
86 (2001). 
 31. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT §§ 1–13, 9C U.L.A. 39–58 (2001).  
2012] CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 13 
Enforcement Act32 and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.33 While 
the former pertains to child custody enforcement and the latter to child and 
spousal support, each state was required to adopt the uniform legislation as 
part of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcili-
ation Act of 1996.34 Increasingly, family law has morphed into a national 
conglomeration. 
It took decades for family law to transform itself from a patchwork of 
local laws into a more national and consistent assemblage. It took far less 
time for family law to become international. Today, family law is impacted 
by an ever-expanding list of international treaties that either provides for 
international enforcement of current federal laws, enforcement of state de-
terminations of custody or support, or that mandates support for various 
international endeavors. For example, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion and Enforcement Act specifically refers to enforcing an order for the 
return of a child made under an international treaty,35 and the Hague Con-
vention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction prohibits 
child kidnapping.36 International adoptions, now commonplace, are included 
in the Uniform Adoption Act37 and are also referenced in the Hague Con-
vention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption.38 These are but a few examples of family law’s in-
ternational application.39  
Family law has evolved from a hodgepodge of local common laws, 
statutes, and practices into an international, pluralistic, and complex process 
governed more by shared goals than local and easily recognizable expecta-
  
 32. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT §§ 101–405, 9 pt. IA 
U.L.A. 657–706 (1999). 
 33. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 101–905 (amended 2001), 9 pt. IB 
U.L.A. 175–270 (2005).  
 34. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, §§ 101–913, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 
7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 35. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 105, 9 pt. IA U.L.A. 
662–63 (1999). 
 36. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 
1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89. 
 37. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §§ 1-101 to 8-106, 9 pt. IA U.L.A. 20–132 (1999).  
 38. Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167. 
 39. For additional examples of international treaties and statutes, see WALTER 
WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN, FAMILY LAW STATUTES: SELECTED UNIFORM LAWS, 
FEDERAL STATUTES, STATE STATUTES, AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 398–456 (Thompson 
Reuters/Foundation Press 4th ed. 2011). See also D. MARIANNE BLAIR & MERLE H. WEINER, 
INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW: CONVENTIONS, STATUTES, AND REGULATORY MATERIALS (2d 
ed. 2010). For cases and materials pertaining to family law, see D. MARIANNE BLAIR & 
MERLE H. WEINER, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW (2d ed. 2009). 
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tions. This evolution has fostered a culture of options and choices that fuels 
private-ordering because it lessens the sense of a local community with a 
shared vision of expectations and practices. For example, marriage, divorce, 
adoption, and procreation have become increasingly optional, multifarious, 
and variable. It is no wonder that individuals perceive so many options 
available for families and look to private-ordering as the only appropriate 
response. 
B. Leveling of Family Law 
The Constitution’s First Amendment states, in part, that: “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”40 When these words were written and adopted, “the 
idea of the state and the concept of religion were fairly well defined and 
quite narrowly limited, and where it was thought that the core ideal of reli-
gious autonomy could be secured by placing matters of religion beyond the 
competence of the national government.”41 But times have changed consid-
erably since the Framers drafted the Constitution. Family law has evolved 
into an international amalgamation. The society in which family law oper-
ates has also expanded considerably, retaining little of its ethnic and reli-
gious coherence. Instead, family law has become increasingly pluralistic and 
electronically interconnected. Today’s family law would be inconceivable to 
colonial America. Within this pluralistic milieu, legislatures have enacted 
choices that contradict the religious worldview of persons and organizations. 
Because the worldview results from history, natural law, and religious texts, 
there are few opportunities to change with the times, and words like “mar-
riage” and “parents” have been defined and practiced for centuries. There is 
no compromising. Hence, religious liberty is challenged. 
Modern legislatures most often avoid any reference to religion or faith-
based values, seeking to remain firmly neutral amidst a religiously diverse 
nation. “The current attitude of the state, political officials included, is often 
one of nominal piety and actual secularism. American politicians, by and 
large, campaign as Christians and govern as secularists.”42 But politicians 
are bereft of options. Disregarding reelection chances, both the modern sec-
ular and religious culture promote acceptance, equality of choice, and non-
discrimination. This is, after all, the culture of private-ordering, where each 
individual must be free to make personal choices. This is the essential ingre-
dient. Who am I to evaluate another’s choice? There is little commonality 
that makes a difference anymore, with the possible exception of being a fan 
  
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 41. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1154 (2d ed. 1988). 
 42. Horwitz, supra note 9, at 149. 
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of a particular sports team. Thus, politicians seek to be neutral as to religion, 
fearful that choosing one will infringe on the choices of others. 
Strict adherence to the American penchant for private-ordering results 
in a church-state policy of strict neutrality when enacting legislation.43 Such 
a policy has been espoused in prior Court decisions. “In the relationship 
between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of 
neutrality.”44 However, there is a dilemma with applying strict neutrality. 
Neutrality of application will always ratify the religious beliefs of some and 
concomitantly will reject the religious beliefs of others. In a nation of such 
diverse religious beliefs, no legislature can please all of the people all of the 
time. For example, while some religious persons adamantly believe that 
marriage is immutably defined as one man and one woman, others bless 
same-sex unions. And some religions teach that assisted reproductive tech-
nology trivializes the integrity of human intercourse, but others see it as a 
part of God’s plan to multiply life upon the earth. To satisfy the legitimate 
expectations of those who are challenged by a neutral application of the 
laws, legislatures could grant a religious accommodation exemption to those 
persons and organizations whose beliefs are adversely impacted.  But of 
course, the exemptions would most likely be given to those organizations 
politically significant enough to demand them, thereby marginalizing most 
religious minorities. Also, whenever a religious accommodation is granted, 
it makes a patchwork of the laws, creating a bizarre world of applicability. 
“Leaving room for legislatures to craft religious accommodations recognizes 
that they may be in a better position than courts to decide when the ad-
vantages of strict neutrality are overstated. But unbounded tolerance of gov-
ernmental accommodation in the name of free exercise neutrality could 
eviscerate the establishment clause.”45 
Prior to 1990, another option existed that permitted legislatures to enact 
neutral laws, yet allow religious persons and organizations to assert First 
Amendment claims so as to avoid compliance.46 Thus, it was possible to 
require the government of action to provide a compelling state reason for 
enacting a statute that adversely affected any religion.47 This heightened 
judicial scrutiny originated in the 1963 Supreme Court decision Sherbert v. 
Verner.48 The facts of the case involved an unemployment compensation 
claim made by a potential worker who refused to accept work on a Saturday 
because that would violate her religious beliefs.49 In ruling that the state had 
  
 43. See Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).  
 44. Id. 
 45. TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1195 (footnote omitted). 
 46. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 399. 
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to accept the potential worker’s Free Exercise right not to work on Saturday, 
the Court held that the state law that infringed upon her religious liberty 
must be strictly scrutinized, mandating the state to demonstrate that the law 
was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.50 The 
holding in Sherbert was reaffirmed and extended in subsequent cases.51 In a 
few decisions, however, the Court rejected Free Exercise claims.52 The ra-
tionale and practical application became increasingly tenuous. 
Then, in 1990, the Court abandoned the strict scrutiny standard for 
government infringement on a Free Exercise claim sufficiently established 
in Employment Division v. Smith.53 There, two Native Americans were dis-
missed from their employment because they were using a hallucinogenic 
drug as part of their religious observance.54 Upon their dismissal, the two 
men sought unemployment compensation from the state, but a state statute 
disqualified them because they had been dismissed from their employment 
due to their misconduct.55 These men sought to excuse the conduct as pro-
tected under the Free Exercise Clause—that peyote, the hallucinogenic drug 
  
 50. Id. at 399, 406 (“It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some 
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the 
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation . . . 
.’”) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 51. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710, 720 (1981) (holding that a 
Jehovah’s Witness was entitled to unemployment compensation when he quit his job in a 
weapons plant because the employment violated his religious beliefs); see also Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 138–39, 146 (1987) (holding that the Com-
mission’s refusal to award unemployment compensation benefits to an employee who was 
discharged when she refused to work on her Sabbath violated the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment).  
 52. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (holding that the Amish 
had to pay Social Security tax); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504, 509–10 
(1986) (holding that Orthodox Jews have no right to wear yarmulkes while serving in the 
military). 
 53. 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990) (“[P]recisely because we value and protect that reli-
gious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied 
to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the 
highest order.”). For additional commentary on the decision, see James G. Dwyer, The Good, 
The Bad, and the Ugly of Employment Division v. Smith for Family Law, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1781 (2011); James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CALIF. L. 
REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and 
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); John T. Noonan, Jr., The End of Free 
Exercise?, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 567 (1992); Raymond C. O’Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The 
Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandating That Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1 (1991); Richard Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise After Employment 
Division v. Smith: Same-Sex Marriage, the “War on Terror,” and Religious Freedom, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2009 (2011). 
 54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
 55. Id. 
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they used during the course of a religious ceremony, should be exempted 
from any misconduct allegation because of their free exercise of religion.56 
The Court, in a break from the precedent established by Sherbert, ruled that 
a burden on the Free Exercise rights of a claimant, no matter how severe, 
does not violate the First Amendment.57 The state statute would be upheld as 
long as the infringement was “merely the incidental effect of a generally 
applicable and otherwise valid provision.”58 Thus, as long as the statute does 
not impose any special sanctions against a particular religion, or seek to 
compel religious beliefs, the statute is valid.59 
The Smith decision deprives both religious organizations and persons 
of judicial strict scrutiny that had once protected them from state statutes 
unless the state could provide a compelling interest. This protection extend-
ed to all religious denominations, regardless of the ability to muster the 
votes warranting a state statutory accommodation exemption. The author of 
the opinion, Justice Scalia, acknowledged that the Smith decision would 
place minority religions at a distinct disadvantage since the political process 
would not be as fruitful for them as it would be for larger, more politically 
powerful denominations.60 Nonetheless, this “unavoidable consequence of 
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance 
of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”61 
Following the Smith decision, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act,62 which sought to apply strict scrutiny to any law impacting 
religions, as was previously done in Sherbert. The Supreme Court invalidat-
ed the act as applied to the states but not for federal laws.63 Subsequently, 
states adopted their own versions of the federal statutes,64 and Congress 
passed another statute—the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
  
 56. Id. at 876. 
 57. Id. at 884–85. 
 58. Id. at 878. 
 59. Id. at 877–78. 
 60. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 
(2006). 
 63. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 
(2006). 
 64. See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493 to 41-1493.04 
(2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01–761.04 
(West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-401 to 73-404 (2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 
35/1–35/99 (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.302–1.307 (West Supp. 2012); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to 28-22-5 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251–258 (West 
2008); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401–2407 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1 to 
42-80.1-4 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to 1-32-60 (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. §§ 110.001–110.012 (West 2011). 
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sons Act of 200065—applying a form of strict scrutiny to any statute affect-
ing land use and the religious rights of prisoners. This federal statute left the 
consequences of the Smith decision intact. In effect, the Smith decision re-
turned the argument over claims of religious liberty infringement to the rule 
that the states are free to regulate actions but not beliefs. This is the same 
distinction made in the Reynolds decision a century earlier.66 However, this 
test offers very little accommodation to persons and organizations advocat-
ing a worldview that incorporates religious values. Without the protection of 
Sherbert’s compelling state interest requirement, state laws could infringe 
on religious liberty of adherents as long as those laws did not single out any 
one religion.67  
Religious organizations sought to safeguard their religious worldview 
against state legislation with little success. One success occurred in a case 
focusing on whether there is a ministerial exception to suits brought by em-
ployees alleging discrimination in employment.68 The petitioner, a kinder-
garten teacher at a Lutheran school, was fired from her position as a “called 
teacher” because of her insubordination and disruptive behavior.69 She then 
filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), alleging that her employment had been terminated because of a 
medical condition diagnosed as narcolepsy and that the termination violated 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).70 Based on her complaint, the 
EEOC brought suit against the Lutheran school, alleging that the respondent 
fired the petitioner because she threatened to bring suit against the school.71 
At issue was whether the petitioner’s suit against the religious employer was 
barred because of a ministerial exception that precluded certain employment 
discrimination claims against religious institutions.72 The Supreme Court 
  
 65. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc 
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held that a ministerial exception to enforcement of employment claims did 
exist.73  
The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their 
ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, 
or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a 
mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal gov-
ernance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection 
of those who will personify its beliefs.74 
The petitioner was considered a minister of the church because she had a 
formal title in the church school, which was given to her by the church, and 
because she performed important religious functions for the church.75 Her 
suit was thus covered under the ministerial exception and dismissed accord-
ingly.76 
The Court distinguished the Smith decision, holding that “Smith in-
volved government regulation of only outward physical acts.”77 Here, on the 
other hand, the petitioner’s claim “concern[ed] government interference 
with an internal church decision that affect[ed] the faith and mission of the 
church itself.”78 Because the petitioner was a minister in the church, her 
dismissal involved an internal church-related matter, and the petitioner’s 
dismissal was exempted from the normal protections offered to employees 
through the EEOC: “Because [petitioner] was a minister within the meaning 
of the exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employ-
ment discrimination suit against her religious employer.”79 And in announc-
ing for the first time a ministerial exception when an employee seeks protec-
tion under the EEOC, the Court affirmed churches’ rights under the First 
Amendment to choose “who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and 
carry out their mission.”80 
The fact that the Court, for the first time, provided for a ministerial ex-
ception to employment discrimination cases does not mean that it altered the 
landscape of laws adversely affecting religious persons and organizations. 
Today, the state of religious liberty cases can be summarized as this: “Laws 
aimed at religion are subjected to searching scrutiny, while neutral and gen-
  
Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (holding that the religious hospital did not 
waive its First Amendment right to ministerial exception, which precluded the suit brought 
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 73. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 707–08 (noting significantly that petitioner used her own title). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 707. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709. 
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erally applicable laws do not trigger the Free Exercise Clause at all, even if 
they impose significant incidental burdens on religious practice.”81 What this 
means is that “the Church is understood as requiring not a favored, publicly 
authorized position in society but only the protected ability to be socially 
engaged.”82 Within such a climate, religious persons and organizations must 
mobilize their resources and exert their influence within the political pro-
cess.83 However, religious denominations have been affected by the private-
ordering prevalent within society as a whole. At one time, the political clout 
of a denomination such as the Roman Catholic Church (“Church”) in the 
United States was formidable. An illustration is the Church’s Legion of De-
cency (“Legion”), which was organized in 1935 and provided an official 
Catholic movie classification system out of an office in New York City.84 If 
the Church condemned a movie because of such features as sex and vio-
lence, Catholics, and many others, would boycott the film. The movie studi-
os worked with the Legion to arrive at an agreement that would permit any 
movie to receive a favorable rating and permit attendance by Catholics and 
those others influence by the ratings. And there are many other examples, 
which include running for political office, expanding the parochial school 
system, and influencing the development of the labor movement. The cen-
tral identity that was both so prevalent and so cohesive among religious ad-
herents a century ago has been replaced by individuality and autonomy—a 
significant development in the pursuit of religious liberty. 
C. Private-Ordering Congregations 
It is impossible to generalize about the coherence of any or all of the 
religious denominations in the United States. There are too many of them, 
and they are often organized in such a way that, at best, each denomination 
operates as an independent entity within a unified group. Thus, the political 
ability of any one of them is difficult to gauge. Nonetheless, the largest reli-
gious denomination in the United States—the Roman Catholic Church—is 
sufficiently organized and documented to provide an appraisal of this ques-
tion: whether political activism is feasible. The Church has a documented 
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record of resistance to modern developments in the four family law issues to 
be discussed in this Article. This resistance includes consistently opposing 
the liberalization of divorce laws; continually resisting the legalization of 
same-sex marriage; specifying, for adoption rules as utilized in Catholic 
institutions, that parents should be married and of the opposite sex; and con-
demning assisted reproductive technology and any specific state or federal 
health care initiatives that conflict with the its teachings. Through its nation-
al organization, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB), the Church has developed and maintains a consistent record per-
taining to each of these family law issues: divorce, marriage, adoption, and 
assisted reproduction. Often, positions adopted by the USCCB result from 
documents issued from the Vatican or from statements made by individual 
bishops. The challenge to the religious liberty of the Roman Catholic 
Church is documented and precise. Because of its hierarchical structure and 
documented record, there is an opportunity to evaluate the Church’s ability 
to mobilize its adherents to effectively operate within the political arena. 
This has become the answer to the challenge to religious liberty—political 
activism to initiate accommodation. 
The Roman Catholic Church in the United States is large and exten-
sive. Since 1965, “the number of Catholics in the United States has grown 
rapidly, from 46.9 million in 1967 to 68.1 million in 2009. On average, 
some 500,000 Catholics were added to parish rosters each year almost with-
out fail.”85 In addition, the parishes are very diverse: “Racial and ethnic mix, 
places of origin, educational levels, and rural, urban, or suburban location 
are among them.”86 In addition to ethnic and racial diversity, the education 
level of Catholics has increased to the highest of nearly any religious group; 
congregational populations have shifted from rural to suburban parishes—
and, to a lesser degree, urban parishes too.87 This changing face of the Ro-
man Catholic Church has contributed to a membership that is far different 
from the Catholics who arrived from Europe almost two centuries ago. At 
that time, each ethnic group built its own church, fostered its own priests, 
and buried its parishioners in the Catholic cemetery that it built next to the 
Catholic school its children attended. Today, in contrast to the ethnically 
created divisions of old, there are significant numbers of “very active core 
Catholics, whose commitment is chosen rather than merely inherited or im-
  
 85. Katarina Schuth, Assessing the Education of Priests and Lay Ministers, in THE 
CRISIS OF AUTHORITY IN CATHOLIC MODERNITY 320 (Michael J. Lacey & Francis Oakley 
eds., 2011). However, it is important to note that “between 1967 and 2007 almost a quarter of 
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CATHOLIC MODERNITY, supra, at 350. 
 86. Schuth, supra note 85, at 320. 
 87. Id.  
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posed, [and they] have created an extraordinarily vibrant and participatory 
grassroots parish life, just as post-Vatican II liberals dreamed might hap-
pen.”88 
The post-Vatican II generations have not grown up with the strong sense 
of Catholic cultural identity that characterized Irish, Italian, Polish, Ger-
man (and so on) “ethnic” Catholics in their parents’ and grandparents’ 
formative years. Nor were they formed with a 1960s confidence in the 
transformative possibilities of participatory democracy in society and 
church. . . . Some embrace Catholic teaching about sex and marriage or 
the more antiestablishment aspects of Catholic social teaching as a way 
of standing up against individualism, consumerism, militarism, and other 
modern forms of . . . temptation . . . .89  
Undoubtedly, younger Catholics have grown up in a time of Vatican II’s 
acceptance of pluralism, religious tolerance, self-fulfillment, and individual 
rights. Throughout the twentieth century, there was an emphasis on personal 
autonomy, and some would describe that as one of the century’s most im-
portant cultural developments.90 Obviously, this places Roman Catholics in 
a similar cultural milieu as their non-Catholic neighbors. 
Likewise, this sense of individualism and private-ordering suggests that 
the Church’s moral authority has been diminishing since Vatican II.91  
In 1963, more than half of American Catholics accepted the church’s 
teaching that contraceptive birth control was wrong; in a 1987 poll, only 
18 percent said it was wrong. A 1993 survey found only 13 percent of 
Catholics holding that conviction. In that survey, only 12 percent of 
Catholics under age fifty said they agreed with “all” church teaching on 
faith and morality; of those fifty and older, the figure was 28 percent. 
The act of disobeying or simply ignoring a church pronouncement, espe-
cially when a person knows that millions of others are also doing it, cre-
ates alienation from the pronouncement itself.92 
The justification for departing from the official teachings of the 
Church’s bishops often arises in the context of freedom of conscience.  
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In the final analysis, to recognize that freedom of conscience is a funda-
mental right, that it is an essential component of human agency, must re-
quire a recognition within the church itself that each Christian must be 
free to exercise his or her judgment in applying the gospel to contingent 
moral or political circumstances, in finding a language to articulate the 
faith, and to make whatever sense they can of the enigmas we live with 
and in.93  
Such a view comports with the culture of private-ordering. One Catholic 
commentator writes that Catholic moral theology, in general, at the begin-
ning of the new century, “is ‘personalistic,’ assuming the dignity and free-
dom of the person, along with the person’s indispensable connection to oth-
ers through social relationships and institutions.”94 Many Catholics asserting 
the indispensable role of conscience find support in the documents that form 
the legacy of the Council of Vatican II, all published in the mid-1960s.95 
Catholics find a respect for conscience in subsequent documents too. For 
example, Pope John Paul II wrote: 
[T]he right to religious freedom and to respect for conscience on its jour-
ney towards the truth is increasingly perceived as the foundation of the 
cumulative rights of the person. This heightened sense of the dignity of 
the human person and of his or her uniqueness, and of the respect due to 
the journey of conscience, certainly represents one of the positive 
achievements of modern culture.96 
But there is an argument for limitations on the freedom of individual 
conscience. The Church holds its faith in a hierarchical fashion, and the 
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bishops claim a scriptural preeminence in making decisions. Thus, con-
science and free choice are crucial elements in the life of faith, but sacred 
texts and scripture provide a firm basis of authority. Donald Cardinal Wuerl, 
the Archbishop of Washington, explains the interaction between individual 
conscience and the authority of the bishops in the following manner:  
Everyone, therefore, has a moral duty to see to it that his or her con-
science is informed. While true in matters of moral decision-making, this 
is all the more crucial in matters of faith. The Catholic faith is founded 
upon divine revelation and contains truths that exceed human under-
standing and must be accepted on the basis of the divine authority. Ac-
cording to Catholic teaching, bishops as successors of the apostles are 
the authoritative teachers of the truths of faith. Individual judgment or 
opinion based on human reason, no matter how sincerely held, can never 
have the last word.97  
The limitation on private-ordering motivated by conscience is the scriptural 
authority of the bishops. 
Contemporary commentators suggest that modern Catholics increasing-
ly doubt the primacy of the bishops’ moral authority. “Over time, Catholics 
moved away from looking to church leaders as the appropriate source of 
moral authority and toward the individual.”98 Some authors point to 1968 
when the Pope issued the encyclical Humanae Vitae,99 which made artificial 
contraception gravely sinful for Catholics. The encyclical produced instant 
and significant opposition among many members of the clergy, theologians, 
and very literate and committed lay Catholics.100 More recently, Catholics 
point to the child sex abuse scandal that implicated so many of the nation’s 
bishops in the movement of abusive priests from parish to parish despite 
numerous credible indications that sexual abuse had, in fact, occurred.101 
These two events lead some commentators to conclude that “[w]hen it 
comes to sex, [they] very much fear, the Catholic Church has drifted into 
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irrelevance with near-disastrous consequences.”102 For other commentators, 
there is a suspicion that the faithful now distinguish the bishops’ authority—
recognizing their authority over matters pertaining to sacramental life but 
not over matters constituting moral life.103 If correct, this dichotomy in 
Church authority will impede its efforts to motivate congregants to seek 
political accommodation from state statutes that challenge religious liberty. 
At least within the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, efforts 
to mobilize congregants to support or to overturn legislation that challenges 
the worldview of the Church have been affected by the cultural phenomenon 
of private-ordering. Arguably, the task of mobilizing congregants has been 
further adversely affected by decisions or pronouncements made by the 
Church about which congregants, often arguing conscience, disagree. In 
spite of this concern, American Church leaders are increasingly calling upon 
congregants to become politically active. “Cardinal Timothy Dolan[, Arch-
bishop of New York and President of the USCCB,] called on Roman Catho-
lic worshippers Saturday to become more involved in politics as the church 
stands against the government in what he called a ‘freedom of religion bat-
tle.’”104 Cardinal Donald Wuerl, Archbishop of Washington, asked that let-
ters be read to congregants at Sunday services and contacted parishioners by 
email to oppose same-sex marriage in Maryland and the federal mandate to 
provide contraception for all employees. These efforts to enter the political 
arena will depend upon factors that will be explored further. We proceed 
now to each of the four areas of family law where it seems that the challenge 
to religious liberty has been, and continues to be, most radical: divorce, mar-
riage, adoption, and parentage. 
II. DIVORCE 
A. Statutory Challenge 
Divorce, like other family law matters in the United States, evolved 
from the laws and mores of the immigrants’ homeland. For the majority of 
the colonies, this meant that divorce law originated in England. Thus, since 
divorce was rarely permitted in England, it was practically unavailable in 
the American colonies.105 “In many southern states, the only way to get a 
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divorce was to petition the legislature. . . . [S]ome northern states had estab-
lished a system of judicial divorce as early as the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury: Courts, not legislatures, granted divorces. . . .”106 Where divorce was 
possible, the petitioner had to obtain residency in a state permitting divorce, 
then commence an adversarial process by which he or she had to prove that 
the other spouse was guilty of a fault that went to the essence of the mar-
riage—a fault so grievous that the marriage could not continue.107 In addi-
tion, the petitioner had to prove that he or she was not equally at fault (re-
crimination), had not condoned the fault of the other party (condonation), 
had not purposely brought about the fault (connivance), and was not acting 
in tandem with the other party to precipitate the end of the marriage (collu-
sion). Finally, the petitioner had to commence the action within a reasonable 
period of time after the occasion of the offense upon which the divorce was 
premised (laches).108 
The fault grounds available to a petitioner varied among the states. The 
most common were cruelty, desertion, and adultery.109 The longer the mar-
riage, the greater the amount of cruelty courts required to end it; the deser-
tion had to be for at least one year, without provocation, and the petitioner 
had to want the deserting spouse to return.110 Adultery only required a dispo-
sition for and an occasion to commit the offense. Absent from adultery was 
any requirement that the act of sexual intercourse be witnessed or record-
ed.111 Most states had additional fault grounds, such as habitual drunkenness, 
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homosexuality, fraud, or a felony conviction and imprisonment. In Hawaii, 
it was possible to obtain a divorce from a spouse who had contracted lepro-
sy.112 A few states became “divorce mills” because they enacted multiple 
grounds for divorce, had short residency periods, and proof or corroboration 
of the fault was relatively easy. A petitioner with sufficient assets could go 
to one of these states, provide proof of residency, obtain a valid divorce, and 
return to his or her true residency with a decree of divorce.113 The petition-
er’s true state of residency, even if its own procedures were significantly 
more stringent, was forced to recognize the divorce judgment obtained in 
the other state due to the requirement of Full Faith and Credit. 
Often couples would mutually agree on a need to end their moribund 
marriage, and stage the needed divorce ground.114 A stranger, hired by the 
couple, would arrive at a hotel room where one spouse and a stranger were 
minimally dressed or there would be pictures taken from outside of a hotel 
room’s window, indicating an occasion of adultery. Courts routinely accept-
ed these sham fault grounds and granted the divorce. If not, the couple could 
go to a foreign country and obtain a divorce there, often in a matter of days. 
But the defect in foreign divorces is that they are not entitled to Full Faith 
and Credit in the couple’s home state.115 They are, however, entitled to com-
ity, an equity device that looks to the fairness of the procedure. If the di-
vorce is bilateral, with both parties to the marriage present in the foreign 
country, then the home state is very likely to award comity. 
If a petitioner could not meet the requirements of a fault divorce, or 
simply did not want to completely end the marriage, it was possible to ob-
tain a limited divorce, often referred to as a divorce a mensa et thoro.116 
States maintained a separate list of grounds for this limited divorce, which 
entitled the petitioner to live separate and apart from his or her spouse, with 
awards of child custody and support.117 The disadvantage was that neither 
party could marry someone else; the spouses were merely separated from 
“bed and board.” If one of the spouses died during the time the divorce a 
mensa et thoro was in effect, the surviving spouse was entitled to inherit 
from the estate of the decedent plus partake in any other benefit available to 
a surviving spouse. Thus, the effect of this limited divorce was to keep the 
marriage intact while providing for an order of support. Likewise, the in-
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tense adversarial process involved in the previously described fault divorce 
was also designed to keep the marriage intact by making the process very 
litigious. Those spouses with adequate resources and attorneys could cir-
cumvent the process and exit from the marriage easily. But overall, the poli-
cy of the states was one of keeping the couple together, most often for the 
sake of any children, in hopes that the spouses would reconcile and be hap-
pier than before.118 Admittedly, the process also ratified the importance of 
marriage as an institution. 
During the 1960s, commensurate with the discovery of a right to mari-
tal privacy in the Constitution119 and what may be argued as the start of a 
cultural awakening to private-ordering, a development occurred in England 
that would have a significant impact on divorce in America. “In 1964 the 
Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury appointed a committee to review di-
vorce in England. In 1966 that committee submitted the Mortimer Report 
which recommended that divorce be granted in England upon a no-fault 
ground.”120 Almost immediately, no-fault divorce was permitted in England 
and in 1969, California became the first American state to follow suit.121 The 
new law was to eliminate the adversary process of fault divorce. Under the 
new system, either party could petition for a divorce, regardless of fault. No 
longer would one of the parties have to prove adultery, cruelty, desertion, or 
something equally catastrophic. Instead, either party need only prove that 
the marriage was irretrievably broken, irreconcilable, or that the spouses had 
remained separate and apart for a minimum period of time.122 Any of these 
no-fault grounds would suffice if corroborated by friends, neighbors, or 
even by the other spouse. 
By 1970, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws voted to make irretrievable breakdown the sole ground for divorce, 
eliminating all fault grounds from its statutory proposals.123 When the 
Commissioners proposed the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in 1973, it 
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specified that a marriage was irretrievably broken if the parties had lived 
separate and apart for more than 180 days because of a serious marital dis-
cord.124 And in 1974, the American Bar Association ratified no-fault di-
vorce, recognizing that no-fault was rapidly being adopted in every state. 
Indeed, the movement towards no-fault was swift, and while some states 
also retained the traditional fault grounds, others deleted them from their 
statutes, making no-fault divorce the sole means by which a marriage could 
be dissolved in some jurisdictions.125 
From 1960 to 1990, after the adoption of no-fault divorce legislation by 
all of the states, the divorce rate doubled.126 Critics of no-fault raised many 
objections to the new system. They argued that, under the new divorce stat-
utes, an “innocent spouse” would be forced into an unwanted divorce solely 
to meet the needs of the other spouse, that couples would now able to di-
vorce easily without the time and incentive to work through their prob-
lems,127 and, of course, that children of a divorcing couple would suffer eco-
nomic and social harm.128 For some commentators, no-fault divorce “not 
only rejects some of the old standards as meaningless, undesirable, or 
wrong; it also hesitates to set standards that cannot readily be enforced or 
that go beyond the minimal responsibility expressed in the cant phrase[:] 
‘Do your own thing, as long as you don’t hurt anybody else.’”129 Such com-
ments identify the shift from the worldview of marriage as indissoluble and 
integral to the natural law towards private-ordering. Eventually, a few states 
initiated a backlash; Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona enacted “covenant 
marriage” statutes that allowed the couple to choose to voluntarily restrict 
the possibility of divorce in that state.130 Thus, before entering into marriage, 
the couple will, in accordance with the state statute, enter into pre-marital 
counseling, work to preserve their marriage if discord occurs, and limit 
themselves to one divorce ground of living separate and apart for at least 
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two years.131 Few couples enter into covenant marriages and even among 
those that do, the possibility remains that one of the spouses could always 
go to another state and obtain a divorce based on a ground in that state and 
return to the covenant marriage state with a divorce entitled to Full Faith and 
Credit.132 
The enactment of no-fault divorce implied that marriage was not im-
portant; grounds such as irretrievably broken implied whim and fancy, as 
opposed to the essence of marriage. Those persons and organizations, most 
motivated by religious belief, viewed no-fault divorce legislation as permis-
sive and, worse, dismissive of a worldview that viewed marriage in the con-
text of Hebrew scripture: Adam and Eve, indissoluble, a covenant blessed 
by God.  
For over a century, divorce law reflected and sought to enforce society’s 
sense of the proper moral relations between husband and wife. Indeed, 
the law of divorce was virtually the only law that spoke directly or sys-
tematically to an ideal of marital relations. That ideal included a duty of 
life-long mutual responsibility and fidelity from which a spouse could be 
relieved, roughly speaking, only upon the serious breach of a moral duty 
by the other spouse.133  
The no-fault divorce statutes, by making divorce easier, challenged this 
worldview and the response continues to evolve. 
B. Worldview Response 
The worldview approach often begins with recognition of historical 
precedent. As early as 1832, the Supreme Court of North Carolina ap-
proached annulment and divorce with the greatest reluctance.134 In refusing 
to grant a divorce to a husband who had accused his wife of adultery, the 
Court affirmed the historical underpinnings of marriage:  
[In] all Christian countries, although the [marriage] contract be regarded 
by the law merely as civil, it is usually executed with some religious cer-
emonial; so as in a degree to impress upon it, in the eyes of the individu-
als themselves, a character of holiness—that it may appear to be entered 
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into before a witness who cannot be deceived or forget, and therefore, to 
be infrangible.135  
The court acknowledged marriage as unique because of its character and its 
responsibilities. This decision affirms the worldview of marriage as indis-
soluble except in the most extreme circumstances.  
Is it not wiser, better, kinder to the parties themselves and their issue, to 
declare the engagement to be unsusceptible of modification, much less 
abrogation—to make their union so intimate, so close, and so firm, that 
no discoveries of concealed defects, more than supervenient disease, de-
pravity, dissoluteness or dissension could rend it asunder? Such being 
the case, the state would be the more discretely entered into, and the in-
tercourse through life be the more harmonious.136  
Furthermore, “that nothing could be more dangerous than to allow those 
who have agreed to take each other, in terms for better, for worse, to be 
permitted to say, that one of the parties is worse than was expected, and 
therefore, the contract ought to be no longer binding.”137 
In many early decisions, courts made explicit reference to religious 
texts, scripture, and history. In a 1914 Supreme Court of Missouri decision, 
the court was tasked with establishing the ownership of the proceeds of an 
insurance policy.138 A man and a woman had been married and, while mar-
ried, the man took out a life insurance policy on his life, and the beneficiary 
was his wife. Subsequently, the couple divorced and then the man, still liv-
ing, sought to change the beneficiary on the policy from his wife to his es-
tate. The former wife claimed that he was barred from changing the benefi-
ciary because the husband had instituted the divorce action; she had done 
nothing wrong and thus should not be barred from taking the benefit from 
the policy. The former husband argued that the divorce had revoked the 
beneficiary status of the wife and that he was free to change the beneficiary, 
regardless of whether he initiated the divorce.139 The court, when addressing 
the effect of divorce upon a marriage, quoted from Demosthenes, Hammu-
rabi, Moses, and the scriptural text of Deuteronomy.140 The court then shift-
ed to Jewish customs, the history of the early Roman Empire, and finally the 
oracle at Delphi.141 All of these references to marriage and divorce in the 
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context of history and religious texts reinforced the exceptional nature of 
divorce. 
Subsequent decisions affirm the scriptural and historical precedence 
given to the unique status of marriage. A marriage creates a home,  
welded and cemented together by the strong and weighty ties of solemn 
marital vows; a relationship sanctioned by God and man as the first step 
in stable organized society; an American home, the keystone to the arch 
which supports and sustains our whole social fabric; the hallmark of 
righteous living. Every intendment, implication and suggestion of public 
policy dictates, yes, demands, that this home be restored, stabilized and 
maintained.142  
When the court writes approvingly of divorce, it is only when there has been 
an egregious act done to the marriage relationship, such as adultery. For 
example:  
[A]dultery is the [most] heinous because it is abhorrent to religious be-
liefs, abhorrent in our literature (a history of the aeons of time and cus-
tom), and abhorrent in its very connotation-adulteration of the issue. Old 
Testament (King James Version), Exodus XX, 13 and 17; New Testa-
ment, Matthew V, 28; Shakespeare, King Lear, Act III, scene 6, line 18; 
Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter.143 
American religious denominations, as custodian of the religious texts that 
form a part of this worldview, vary in their approach towards divorce. While 
some teach that the conscience of the individual is paramount, others, such 
as the Roman Catholic Church, teach that divorce is objectively wrong. “Di-
vorce is a grave offense against the natural law. It claims to break the con-
tract, to which the spouses freely consented, to live with each other till 
death. Divorce does injury to the covenant of salvation, of which sacramen-
tal marriage is a sign.”144 The Church also makes specific reference to injury 
that may befall children as a result of divorce: 
Divorce is immoral also because it introduces disorder into the family 
and into society. This disorder brings grave harm to the deserted spouse, 
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to children traumatized by the separation of their parents and often torn 
between them, and because of its contagious effect which makes it truly 
a plague on society.145 
The challenge of no-fault divorce to a worldview based in part on reli-
gious values has waned over the years. Initially, in 1969, when no-fault di-
vorce statutes spread rapidly throughout the country, widespread condemna-
tion and alarm followed. Today, compared to same-sex marriage, changes in 
adoption laws, and technological developments in parentage, no-fault di-
vorce seems a relatively miniscule issue. Arguably, however, by enacting 
no-fault divorce, allowing a marriage to be dissolved—especially when 
there are children—upon a ground of undefined irreconcilable differences or 
irretrievably broken, states were eliminating any trace of moral opprobrium 
from divorce. Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon makes this argu-
ment. She argues that laws in America are more than laws; they define who 
we are. “Almost everywhere else, abortions and divorce are treated as small 
tragedies, as civic failures, as tiny rents in the social fabric, unavoidable at 
times, to be sure, but no less to be regretted.”146 But, according to Professor 
Glendon, “American laws bespeak a society that denies the existence of 
external standards, one where people are free to define ‘right and wrong’ 
pretty much as they please.”147 While these comments are indicative of a 
society committed to private-ordering, associating them with divorce indi-
cates the impact that no-fault divorce has had on family law. No-fault di-
vorce, while miniscule in comparison to the other family law issues dis-
cussed in this Article, contributes to a culture of private-ordering. The abil-
ity of either party to end the marriage quickly and easily depreciates the 
value of marriage, a bulwark in the fabric of a worldview that advocates the 
importance of family within human society. 
Private-ordering—divorce and remarriage—within civil law has had an 
impact on the perceptions of Roman Catholics. Between 1987 and 2005, 
Catholics were surveyed to determine whether they look to Church bishops, 
individuals, or both for moral authority on decisions affecting divorce and 
remarriage.148 During those eighteen years, the percentage of Catholics stat-
ing that they looked to individuals, rather than to bishops or both, rose elev-
en percent.149 These statistics indicated that Roman Catholics were increas-
ingly viewing divorce and remarriage as a matter of individual conscience 
rather than something that was of ecclesiastical importance. This fact is re-
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flected in petitions for annulments by Roman Catholics. Compared to for-
eign countries, there are more annulments issued by Church tribunals in the 
United States.150 An annulment, when issued, states that a marriage never 
occurred, even if children were born to the union or when the marriage last-
ed for decades.  
The contrast between the rigid Church teachings on divorce and the en-
thusiasm with which many dioceses hand out annulments reeks of hy-
pocrisy—the American Church accounts for the vast majority of all the 
annulments issued in the world, on grounds as slender as “immaturity” at 
the time of contracting marriage.151  
It has been nearly five decades since no-fault was introduced, propelled 
in part by a culture that developed a sense of private-ordering. Attempts to 
reintroduce stricter standards prior to obtaining a divorce, like statutory cov-
enant marriage, have not been accepted by many state legislatures or by the 
population as a whole. Even among religious organizations like the Roman 
Catholic Church, there is a continuing acceptance of either the possibility of 
obtaining a Church annulment or conscience empowering individuals to 
divorce and remarry without Church sanction, depending upon the morality 
of private-ordering. But the challenge to marriage brought by no-fault di-
vorce cannot be ignored because that challenge impacts other family law 
issues. Adherents to a worldview that rejects divorce have one option: to 
educate the public regarding the unique and immutable characteristics of 
marriage, thereby promoting in individuals the personal motivation of their 
convictions. This seems to be essential to other family law issues such as 
same-sex marriage and assisted reproduction. Adherents to a worldview that 
defines these issues in religious and historical terms must rediscover the 
means by which they can explain this to the public and to their own fellow-
adherents. 
III. MARRIAGE 
A. Statutory Challenge 
In 2007, the United States Census Bureau reported that the median age 
for a first marriage in the United States was 25.6 years for women, and 27.5 
years for men.152 Almost fifty years earlier, in 1960, the average age for a 
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woman getting married was 20.3 years, and for a man it was 22.8 years. It 
appears today that not only are men and women choosing to delay marriage, 
but they are also choosing alternatives to marriage; alternatives that were not 
available in 1960. For example, nonmarital cohabitation increased by more 
than 1,000 percent between 1960 and 2006.153 In addition, many people 
choose to remain single, and some of these persons are single parents. 
The rules to enter into marriage have remained relatively unchanged. 
Many states retain both statutory and common law marriage, and state stat-
utes prohibiting incest often mirror biblical restrictions from Hebrew scrip-
ture.154 Age restrictions on who can enter into marriage vary among the 
states, but they are, as a whole, unchanged. Generally, parties to the mar-
riage must be able to consent, obtain a license, sometimes obtain a blood 
test, and in the case of statutory marriage, participate in a solemnization 
ceremony. In spite of pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court 
that marriage is a fundamental right155 or that consenting adults have a right 
to intimate contact,156 states have continued to ban polygamy, and, in some 
cases, same-sex marriage. 
The most significant statutory challenge to marriage resulted from the 
ability of same-sex couples to enter into marriage. Often, the change oc-
curred because of constitutional challenges, overturning a state’s restrictions 
on marriage that defined marriage as between a man and a woman. These 
challenges involved both state and federal constitutional grounds,157 but 
sometimes states enacted same-sex marriage statutes without prompting by 





 153. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UC-1 Unmarried Partners of the Opposite Sex/1, by Presence 
of Children/2: 1960 to Present, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/uc1.xls. 
 154. See Leviticus 18:6–18, 20:11, 12, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21. 
 155. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that interracial marriage could 
not be prohibited); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that economic 
classifications cannot prohibit marriage). 
 156. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 157. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding that banning 
same-sex persons from entering into civil marriage violates equal protection under Iowa’s 
constitution); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) 
(holding that banning same-sex couples violates the Massachusetts constitution). But see 
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (holding that the state statute banning same-
sex marriage was rationally related to procreation and that it did not violate the ERA or Sub-
stantive Due Process). 
 158. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2012) (“A marriage that is 
otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same 
or different sex.”); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2006 & Supp. 2012) (“Marriage 
is the legally recognized union of 2 people.”). 
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creasing number of states, the process allowing same-sex couples to marry 
began long before the first court decision or legislative session. Arguably, 
same-sex marriage began with the constitutional right to privacy announced 
in Griswold v. Connecticut,159 which was then extended to individuals in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird160 and bolstered by pronouncements that marriage was a 
fundamental right in both Loving v. Virginia161 and Zablocki v. Redhail.162 
While the Supreme Court was deciding these cases, no-fault divorce was 
being legislatively adopted in all of the states, creating additional options for 
adults seeking independence. Contemporaneously, nonmarital cohabitation 
was increasing in popularity. When the Supreme Court of California decided 
Marvin v. Marvin,163 it recognized the enforceability of both oral and written 
contracts between persons of the same or opposite sex who were engaging 
in intimate contact.164 The decision provided both recognition of a trend and 
enforcement of agreements that provided greater protection to adults pursu-
ing privately-ordered relationships. Indeed, this was the time when adult 
Americans were introduced to the possibilities of private, functional rela-
tionships, independent of the forms that dominated their parents’ lives.  Be-
cause these form relationships represented the worldview supported by 
many religious persons and organizations, any alternative represented a 
challenge to a religious and historical worldview. There are a number of 
alternative arrangements. 
1. Nonmarital Cohabitation 
Gradually, the functional associations being adopted by consenting 
adults throughout the 1970s took on more structure. From the year 1960 
until 2006, the number of nonmarital, cohabitating adults increased by more 
than 1000 percent.165 Increasingly throughout this period, courts enforced 
oral and written agreements between nonmarital cohabitants, whereby, for 
example, one party promised to take care of another for a term of years or 
for life.166 Equitable remedies expanded as time passed too.167 The process of 
acceptance expanded from state to federal courts. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled on a case where a nonmarried woman 
  
 159. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 160. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 161. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 162. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 163. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 164. Id. at 122. 
 165. NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 126, at 19.  
 166. See Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 316 (Wis. 1987). 
 167. Courts look to the duration of the relationship, purpose, and services contributed by 
either of the parties. See Devaney v. L’Esperance, 949 A.2d 743 (N.J. 2008); In re Long, 244 
P.3d 26 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
2012] CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 37 
had been cohabitating with a man for more than thirty years.168 The court 
ruled that she was in a “quasi-marital” relationship with the man.169 As such, 
the woman was entitled to half of the man’s pension when they separated, 
plus a division of the property they had accumulated.170 The decision, in 
effect, treated the woman the same as if the man and woman had been mar-
ried and were granted a decree of divorce.171 Additional decisions permitted 
enforcement of the shared expectations of nonmarital cohabitants after the 
death of one of the parties, permitting the expectations to supersede methods 
of testamentary disposition.172 Courts addressing the issue concluded that if 
the parties could recover during life, the claims should be just as effective at 
death. Finally, as will be discussed further in connection with adoption, 
nonmarital cohabitants are increasingly permitted to establish parenthood, 
resulting in custody and visitation rights over any child or children.173 
Opposition to extending marriage-like benefits to nonmarital cohabit-
ants came from persons and organizations seeking to maintain the singulari-
ty of marriage as the sole institution designated to engender support, mutual 
obligations, and commitment necessary to raise children. Their point was 
this: If nonmarital cohabitation precipitated support obligations similar to 
marriage, but without the concomitant obligations, then why would anyone 
marry? Without marriage, the stability so essential to creating a durable 
family structure would evaporate.174 The critics contend that the uniqueness 
of the worldview of marriage is being whittled away by providing all of the 
characteristics of marriage but requiring none of the commitment of mar-
riage. Likewise, nonmarital cohabitation had none of the attributes so im-
portant to worldview adherents: a religious and historical context. These 
attributes require permanence, established by state’s role as a third party in 
any marriage. When the state requires a license and solemnization prior to 
marriage, it signals that the status adopted by the parties is taken seriously. 
This seriousness is evidenced by the state’s unwillingness to release the 
couple from the commitment they made absent permission. Such an assur-
ance is missing from nonmarital cohabitation. Plus, courts are often em-
  
 168. Owens v. Auto. Mach. Pension Trust, 551 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1140 n.2. 
 171. Id.; see also Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816 (Wyo. 2010) (dividing nonmarital 
property in a manner similar to marital property). 
 172. See, e.g., Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); In re Estate of 
Quarg, 938 A.2d 193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
 173. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Services v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, ___ S.W.3d ___ 
(holding that nonmarital cohabitants should not be forced to choose between being parents 
and being in an intimate relationship with another adult); see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 
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 174. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). 
38 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
broiled in determining the private expectations of the parties—a difficult 
task. Indeed, a few states restrict benefits by statute for nonmarital cohabita-
tion, especially as they pertain to same-sex partners.175  
2. Domestic Partnerships & Reciprocal Beneficiaries 
As the percentage of couples living together in nonmarital cohabitation 
increased, so did the need for couples to provide for nonmarital partners in a 
manner similar to marriage. For all nonmarital couples, in a manner similar 
to married couples, there was a need to provide health insurance and addi-
tional employment benefits. For example, one of the parties might wish to 
stay home and provide full-time child care or maintain the joint household. 
In the case of all same-sex cohabitants prior to the ability to marry, their 
health care and benefit needs were of particular concern. In order to meet 
these concerns, certain employers initiated company registration policies 
that allowed employees to register as what they termed “domestic part-
ners.”176 This was a new term, one that originated in American businesses, 
but then spread to government localities and states. By registering as the 
domestic partner of an employee, the non-employed partner could share in 
the employee’s health care benefits and any additional benefits the company 
offered, such as discounts on purchases or companion seats on airlines. Al-
most all companies restricted the new status to same-sex employees, ration-
alizing that opposite-sex couples had the option to marry and thus to estab-
lish benefits.177 Obviously, the concern of companies when domestic part-
nership programs were initiated was to keep good employees satisfied, re-
tained, and to provide a workplace program that mirrored the same benefits 
packages enjoyed by married couples. 
The process of entering into a domestic partnership was simple, the 
employee registered an adult that otherwise qualified. Neither licensure nor 
solemnization was required. Likewise, to terminate the non-employee part-
ner’s status as a beneficiary, the employee simply deleted the partner from 
the registration at the personnel office—unilaterally. A new domestic part-
ner could be registered at the same time. The domestic partnership benefits 
were not entitled to reciprocity at other companies unless the successive 
company stated otherwise and were also limited to what the company could 
offer. Nonetheless, domestic partnership status conferred a modicum of pub-
  
 175. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2008); Cummings v. Cummings, 376 N.W.2d 726 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (permitting enforcement of written agreements between nonmarital 
cohabitants); see also MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2002); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 
(West 2007). 
 176. See Raymond C. O’Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 
32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 178–81 (1995). 
 177. Id. at 178.   
2012] CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 39 
lic recognition—a progression from nonmarital cohabitation.178 Eventually, 
cities and states would adopt the domestic partnership option for same-sex 
couples. Today, the State of California has the most extensive domestic 
partnership statute in the United States: the Domestic Partnership Rights and 
Responsibilities Act of 2003.179 The Act provides same-sex couples domi-
ciled in the state with the same rights as opposite-sex married couples, and if 
the relationship ends in separation or death, the domestic partner is entitled 
to all of the state rights and responsibilities of a spouse. In addition, the Act 
provides for reciprocity with any other state’s status arrangements, exclud-
ing same-sex marriage.180 
Domestic partnerships formed the framework for the next develop-
ment, a new status termed “reciprocal beneficiaries.” In the mid 1990s, 
when the State of Hawaii was on the verge of adopting same-sex marriage, 
the state’s legislature enacted what it called the status of reciprocal benefi-
ciaries.181 Only same-sex, unmarried couples could take advantage of this 
new status that permitted eligible couples to enter and exit the status in a 
manner similar to domestic partnerships. Even though the status provided a 
list of benefits similar to marriage, few other state legislatures followed suit. 
However, Vermont retains the status today, together with same-sex mar-
riage, and Hawaii retains the status but adopted a new status—civil un-
ions—in 2011.182 Civil unions are yet another development towards same-
sex marriage and another alternative for couples seeking to privately-order 
their lives. 
3. Civil Unions 
On July 1, 2000, Vermont became the first state to adopt civil unions, a 
new status for same-sex couples. The ruling of the Vermont Supreme Court 
precipitated the decision to adopt civil unions, holding that the common 
benefits clause of the state constitution guaranteed to each citizen the same 
economic benefits.183 Thus, same-sex and opposite-sex couples had to be 
  
 178. Id. at 218–20. 
 179. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004). However, marriage was defined in the 
California state constitution as between one man and one woman with the passage of Propo-
sition 8. On February 7, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled 
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tee of Equal Protection. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 180. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.2 (West 2004).  
 181. See A Bill for an Act Relating to Unmarried Couples, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383 
(codified at HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1 to 572C-7 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007)). 
 182. See A Bill for an Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws 232 (codified 
at HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572B-1 to 572B-11 (2011)). 
 183. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). 
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treated equally and be able enjoy the same benefits.184 In order to meet this 
mandate, the state legislature enacted legislation that went far beyond do-
mestic partnership and reciprocal beneficiaries. The new status of civil un-
ions required eligible couples to perform all of the requirements of married 
opposite-sex couples. That is, prior to entering into a civil union, couples 
had to be of proper age, provide consent, and not be barred by incest.185 In 
addition, they had to obtain a license from the state, and then submit to a 
solemnization ceremony.186 Then, if they sought to dissolve the civil union, 
eligible couples had to apply to the state for permission in the same manner 
as opposite-sex couples seeking a divorce.187 Civil unions entitle couples to 
all of the state benefits provided to opposite-sex married couples. A civil 
union sought to be as much like marriage as possible without using the term 
marriage. 
In addition to Vermont, other states such as Delaware, Illinois, and 
New Jersey enacted legislation providing for civil unions.188 Hawaii enacted 
civil unions in February 2011, which became effective in January 2012.189 
Vermont, the state that initiated civil unions, followed the lead of other 
states and enacted same-sex marriage legislation.190 The current situation 
among the states is very fluid, with some states recognizing a status from 
another state through reciprocity, while other states bar any recognition of 
same-sex status because of statute or constitutional amendment. Because 
any status obtained in one state is not a judgment, the status is not entitled to 
Full Faith and Credit in another state. To further confuse matters among the 
states, the Defense of Marriage Act191—federal legislation prohibiting any 
federal benefits to same-sex couples—is being challenged by litigation.192 
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 185. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5142 (2000 & Supp. 2012); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
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On February 23, 2011, the Attorney General of the United States announced 
that the United States Department of Justice will no longer defend the con-
stitutionality of the Act as applied to same-sex couples who are validly mar-
ried under any state’s laws.193 
However, the importance of civil unions lies not in its individual status, 
but rather in its role in the evolution of private-ordering. Beginning with 
nonmarital cohabitation, couples were able to enforce promises in manners 
unthinkable as recently as the 1950s. These same couples, albeit same-sex 
couples, were able to obtain a modicum of status through employer-
provided domestic partnership benefits and then through state-sponsored 
domestic partnerships. Eventually, through state constitutional litigation in 
Hawaii, same-sex couples were able to obtain marriage-like economic status 
titled reciprocal beneficiaries.194 Through similar efforts, Vermont’s legisla-
ture enacted civil unions, which mirrored marriage in all but the name it-
self.195 Led by the multitude of opportunities available through private-
ordering of their individual lives, same-sex couples began to assert a right to 
marry too. Heretofore, the definition of marriage—one man and one wom-
an—sufficed to insulate marriage from constitutional challenge.196 But in the 
early 1990s, the insulation weakened, giving rise to constitutional challeng-
es. The worldview’s definition of marriage—as only between one man and 
one woman—was at stake. 
4. Same-Sex Marriage 
Same-sex marriage is a product of private-ordering. Initially the result 
of shifting cultural attitudes marked by the establishment of an individual 
right of privacy, same-sex marriage next evolved with the advent of mar-
riage alternatives like nonmarital cohabitation, domestic partnerships, recip-
rocal beneficiaries, and finally civil unions. Because of technological ad-
vances in communications and media, cultural attitudes of the American 
population also evolved to consider same-sex marriage as a civil right, an 
option that should be available to homosexual persons. Persons and organi-
zations committed to a worldview built upon history, religion, and form 
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relationships were unprepared for the sudden challenge of same-sex mar-
riage. There was no parallel to this in history or in scripture. 
Structurally, same-sex marriage became a reality in 1993 when the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii changed the definition of who could marry.197 Rely-
ing on Loving v. Virginia,198 the Hawaii court presumed that the definition of 
marriage would continue to evolve along with social order and custom.199 In 
Loving, the Supreme Court overruled state statutes that prohibited interracial 
marriage and effectively eliminated race as a barrier to marriage.200 The Ha-
waii Supreme Court viewed the Loving ruling as a change in the definition 
of marriage. If marriage could evolve to include interracial couples, then it 
could evolve to include same-sex couples as well.201 This argument elimi-
nated the definition barrier to same-sex marriage, an obstacle that had pre-
vented constitutional challenge of state statutes defining marriage as be-
tween one man and one woman. Once this definitional barrier to same-sex 
marriage was removed, state statutes restricting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples were open to challenges based on state and federal constitutional 
grounds. With challenges a possibility post-Loving, the Hawaiian court ruled 
that its state statute restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples was uncon-
stitutional based on equal protection guaranteed in the state constitution.202 
Other states would follow suit.203 
Following the court’s decision, Hawaii, like many other states con-
fronting an onslaught of constitutional litigation challenging state prohibi-
tions against same-sex marriage, amended the state constitution that previ-
ously defined marriage as solely between one man and one woman.204 Once 
the definition of marriage is contained in the state constitution, the defini-
tional barrier is in place and is an effective tool against challenges based on 
the state constitution, but there is nothing in the Federal Constitution defin-
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ing marriage. Only a federal challenge will suffice to overturn state bans, 
and there has been no such challenge to date.205  
The most significant challenge to state bans on same-sex marriage is 
the decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the district 
court’s decision.206 The case concerned a 2008 amendment to the California 
Constitution, Proposition 8, by which voters in California amended the 
state’s constitution to define marriage as between one man and one wom-
an.207 Prior to the passage of that amendment, same-sex couples were able to 
marry in California because the state had legalized same-sex marriage.208 In 
a two-to-one vote, the federal appellate court ruled that the state constitu-
tional amendment lessened the status and dignity of gays and lesbians in 
California, thus reclassifying their relationships and families as inferior to 
those of opposite-sex couples.209 The court did not consider the broader 
question of whether same-sex persons have a right under the Constitution to 
marry; it did decide that when same-sex couples previously had the right to 
marry in California, but then the state’s constitutional amendment took away 
that right, the effect was to deny same-sex couples Equal Protection guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment.210 
A majority of states enacted constitutional amendments defining mar-
riage as between one man and one woman.211 These amendments were 
adopted prior to legalization of same-sex marriage, in contrast to the Cali-
fornia litigation. But even in those states lacking a constitutional amend-
ment, state courts sometimes mandated same-sex marriage through constitu-
tional interpretations that found any denial was a denial of equal protection, 
privacy, or freedom of association. In some states, the legislatures specifi-
cally enacted legislation permitting same-sex marriage;212 however, Maine 
and other states, enacted same-sex marriage only to see those enactments 
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repealed via voter referendum.213 In 2009, Vermont became the first state to 
enact same-sex marriage legislation without judicial prompting.214 This is a 
unique development in the progress of private-ordering. Prior to Vermont’s 
legislative enactment, adoption of same-sex marriage came about because of 
a state’s judiciary. Since then, additional legislatures have imitated the Ver-
mont initiative, including New Hampshire,215 the District of Columbia,216 
New York,217 and California.218 It is safe to conclude that same-sex marriage 
has established itself as a successor to the private-ordering initiated in Gris-
wold’s right to privacy in 1965 and nurtured through decades of nonmarital 
cohabitation and various status arrangements similar to marriage.219 The 
events surrounding the 2011 adoption of same-sex marriage by the legisla-
ture in New York State illustrates this fact. 
On June 24, 2011, New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, the son of 
former governor Mario Cuomo, signed the bill that legalized same-sex mar-
riage in the state.220 The state judiciary did not prompt the legislation; rather, 
the bill was the product of the governor himself: a Catholic living in a 
nonmarital cohabitation arrangement with a woman. The governor “used the 
force of his personality and relentlessly strategic mind to persuade conflict-
ed lawmakers” to vote for the measure.221 When asked why they voted for 
same-sex marriage, legislators responded that “they were inclined to see the 
issue as one of personal freedom, consistent with their more libertarian 
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views.”222 As further evidence of the shift in attitudes regarding private-
ordering, Georgetown University historian, Michael Kazin, in reference to 
the New York legislation, states that “in general, Americans are more [like-
ly] to support movements from the left or from the right that talk in terms of 
rights and individual freedom than talk about collective rights or responsi-
bilities.”223 
Likewise, Maryland’s same-sex marriage legislation was initiated by a 
Catholic governor, Martin O’Malley, who likened the legislation to civil 
rights.224 Overall, the same-sex debate illustrates the contrast between those 
persons who have adopted the opportunities provided by private-ordering 
and those whose worldview limits those possibilities through history, reli-
gion, and natural law. 
B. Worldview Response 
Historically, the earliest state court opinions pertaining to marriage 
contained references to Hebrew or Christian scripture texts.225 These reli-
gious references were often intermingled with quotes from literary or philo-
sophical authors, all evidencing the worldview that marriage was more than 
a civil contract between two adults; it was a living symbol of the intercon-
nectedness of humanity and the natural order of things. The following evi-
dences this worldview: “[T]he demands of our common human nature have 
shaped (however imperfectly) all of our religious traditions to recognize this 
natural institution. As such, marriage is the type of social practice whose 
basic contours can be discerned by our common human reason, whatever 
our religious background.”226 
Scripture, history, and natural law were interwoven into many of the 
early court decisions. When ruling on a petition to annul a marriage, an Ar-
kansas judge referenced how a woman was made from the rib of Adam, and 
this made them one person in the law.227 The unity of husband and wife is a 
common theme in court opinions; one taken from frequent biblical refer-
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ences in some of the oldest American decisions.228 Some of the cases refer to 
marriage as part of “[t]he moral law as promulgated to man by the light of 
reason . . . rightly . . . called natural law.”229 In so doing, the cases reaffirm 
the worldview premise that family law is immutable, the product of history, 
codified in scripture. 
[There is] but “one and the same law, eternal and immutable, [and it] 
shall be prescribed for all nations and all times, and the God who shall 
prescribe, introduce and promulgate this law shall be the one common 
Lord and Supreme ruler of all, and whosoever will refuse obedience to 
Him shall be filled with confusion, as this very act will be a virtual deni-
al of his human nature . . . .”230  
Consistently, the cases affirm the traditional definition of marriage as be-
tween one man and one woman and conclusively linked to mutual satisfac-
tion of the parties and to the procreation and care of children.  
For both men and women, marriage was the major determinant of wealth 
and status. For men, marriage secured the legitimacy of their offspring, 
and with legitimacy and primogeniture, the right of succession and au-
thority over the family’s holdings. For women, marriage provided the 
only available form of support and the only socially sanctioned role out-
side the convent. Women had few opportunities for an independent eco-
nomic existence, and in societies that prized virginity, little opportunity 
for remarriage once the union was consummated.231  
The definition of marriage as one man and one woman became 
changeable with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Baehr v. 
Lewin.232 Not only was the decision surprising, but it was also impossible for 
proponents of the worldview of marriage. Nonetheless, as a result of the 
decision, state statutes restricting marriage to persons of the opposite-sex 
became vulnerable to federal and state constitutional challenge. Among  
these challenges were those impacting guarantees of free speech, privacy, 
due process, and equal protection. In addition to the challenges themselves, 
questions remained as to standard of review to be applied to those challeng-
es—either rational basis or strict scrutiny. 
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Following ten years of litigation, many states amended their constitu-
tions to define marriage as between one man and one woman—effectively 
barring challenge at the state level. But then in 2003, the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts overturned its state statute banning same-sex marriage,233 and 
other state courts followed suit.234 Some state courts, relying on the 
worldview previously explained, decided that the historical, scriptural, and 
natural law worldview was rationally related to the state’s interest in respon-
sible procreation235 or that there was historical grounding in such a ban. Both 
of these bases were sufficient to refute any challenge based on equal protec-
tion or due process, assuming rational basis was the correct standard.236 And, 
the rational basis test, rather than compelling state interest, was justified 
because same-sex marriage is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”237 This is evidenced in a decision rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge to the state’s ban on same-sex marriage. A New York court wrote: 
It is an undisputed biological fact that the vast majority of procreation 
still occurs as a result of sexual intercourse between a male and a female. 
In light of such fact, “[t]he State could reasonably decide that by encour-
aging opposite-sex couples to marry, thereby assuming legal and finan-
cial obligations, the children born from such relationships will have bet-
ter opportunities to be nurtured and raised by two parents within long-
term, committed relationships, which society has traditionally viewed as 
advantageous for children.”238 
Then, as an addendum, the court noted that if change were to come to the 
status of marriage, it must occur within the legislature, who is better able to 
decide such issues.239 
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Worldview arguments emphasizing that marriage should be restricted 
to opposite-sex couples often, like the New York decision, identify the 
unique and historical procreative function operating in the context of oppo-
site-sex couples. Of course, this referred to sexual intercourse. While same-
sex couples may procreate through assisted reproductive technology, this 
possibility is rejected by worldview advocates as incidental to sexual inter-
course and should not detract from the means of procreation existing from 
the start of creation.  
In coitus, but not in other forms of sexual contact, a man and a woman’s 
bodies coordinate by way of their sexual organs for the common biologi-
cal purpose of reproduction. . . . By extension, bodily union involves mu-
tual coordination toward a bodily good—which is realized only through 
coitus. . . . But two men or two women cannot achieve organic bodily 
union since there is no bodily good or function toward which their bod-
ies can coordinate, reproduction being the only candidate. This is a clear 
sense in which their union cannot be marital, if marital means compre-
hensive and comprehensive means, among other things, bodily.240  
 
Importantly, this quote, and similar views shared by others, not only identi-
fies the main reason why same-sex marriage is impossible but also identifies 
the immorality of assisted reproductive technology. 
Parentage options provided through assisted reproductive technology 
have adversely affected the rational relationship between state statutes re-
stricting marriage to opposite-sex couples and the traditionally advanced 
governmental interests. Permitting same-sex couples, married or otherwise, 
and single persons to adopt children affects the rational relationship in a 
similar manner. Because parentage is now possible outside of sexual inter-
course, restricting marriage to persons who can procreate through sexual 
intercourse is viewed as irrational. Courts have taken note of this develop-
ment. When overturning Iowa’s ban on same-sex marriage, the state’s high-
est court wrote that “[g]ay and lesbian persons are capable of procrea-
tion.”241 The court ignored the uniqueness of sexual intercourse and the his-
torical underpinning of marital procreation. Instead, what mattered to that 
court was procreation itself.242 In similar fashion, other courts have rejected 
the argument that coitus is the sole means of procreation. Ruling that the ban 
on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court wrote that “[o]ur laws of civil marriage do not privilege procreative 
heterosexual intercourse between married people above every other form of 
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adult intimacy and every other means of creating a family.”243 The court 
then added that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts  
affirmatively facilitates bringing children into a family regardless of 
whether the intended parent is married or unmarried, whether the child is 
adopted or born into a family, whether assistive [reproductive] technolo-
gy was used to conceive the child, and whether the parent or her partner 
is heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual. If procreation were a necessary 
component of civil marriage, our statutes would draw a tighter circle 
around permissible bounds of nonmarital child bearing and the creation 
of families by noncoital means.244 
Opponents of same-sex marriage have offered alternative reasons to re-
strict marriage to persons of the opposite sex. For example, in addition to the 
uniqueness of coitus, opponents have argued that children thrive better in 
families where both a man and a woman are present as parents.245 But courts 
and legislatures, when asked to accept the rationality of this argument, have 
most often rejected it.246 The decisions often note that state policy pertaining 
to foster care, adoption, and overall preferences of what is in the best inter-
est of a child, suggests that “people in same-sex couples may be ‘excellent’ 
parents.”247 Furthermore, the Iowa Supreme Court wrote: 
If the statute [banning same-sex marriage] was truly about the best inter-
est of children, some benefit to children derived from the ban on same-
sex civil marriages would be observable. Yet, the germane analysis does 
not show how the best interests of children of gay and lesbian parents, 
who are denied an environment supported by the benefits of marriage 
under the statute, are served by the ban. Likewise, the exclusion of gays 
and lesbians from marriage does not benefit the interests of . . . children 
of heterosexual parents, who are able to enjoy the environment supported 
by marriage with or without the inclusion of same-sex couples.248  
The court continues its rationale for holding that children are not adversely 
affected by being raised in same-sex households, suggesting that any effort 
to restrict children to opposite-sex households may be a product of bias ra-
ther than fact. Rejecting same-sex couples as ideal parents “suggests stereo-
type and prejudice, or some other unarticulated reason, could be present to 
explain the real objectives of the statute[ banning same-sex marriage].”249 
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Most often, the worldview objection to same-sex marriage initiatives 
depends heavily upon history, natural law, and religious underpinnings.     
Although not likely to be a part of civil court decisions as it was in the past, 
religious belief has been accepted as a rational reason to prohibit same-sex 
marriage.250 Perhaps religion is synonymous with historical precedent. That 
is, because scripture, admittedly historical, defines marriage as between one 
man and one woman, the definition must be immutable. Furthermore, the 
definition is grounded in historical practice, suggesting that it encompasses 
the natural way of doing things. All courts recognize the historical and scrip-
tural basis of the definition and practice of marriage as between a man and a 
woman. “Religious objections to same-sex marriage are supported by thou-
sands of years of tradition and biblical interpretation.”251 But recently, courts 
observe that some religious persons and organizations support same-sex 
marriage, and to choose one set of beliefs over another is barred by the Con-
stitution.252 “Thus . . . we proceed as civil judges, far removed from the theo-
logical debate of religious clerics, and focus only on the concept of civil 
marriage and the state licensing system . . . .”253 Understandably, the courts 
adopt the same approach as many of the previous decisions involving stat-
utes that impact religious liberty. A distinction is to be made between reli-
gious beliefs and civil practices, the courts and the legislatures are responsi-
ble only for the latter.254 
The Roman Catholic Church is at the forefront of opposition to same-
sex marriage. The Catechism of the Catholic Church affirms the immutable 
definition of marriage. While doing so, it recounts the first book of scripture, 
Genesis, in which man and woman are created in the likeness of God, and 
then concludes by calling attention to the fact that scripture ends with the 
Book of Revelation, in which there is a vision of the wedding-feast of the 
Lamb.255 Throughout its description of marriage, the Catechism affirms the 
one man and one woman aspect of marriage as well as the historical under-
pinnings of the institution.256 “The vocation to marriage is written in the very 
nature of man and woman as they come from the hand of the Creator. Mar-
riage is not a purely human institution despite the many variations it may 
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have undergone through the centuries in different cultures, social structures, 
and spiritual attitudes.”257 In the documents of the Second Vatican Council, 
a universal council that impacted every aspect of the Church, there are af-
firmations of marriage being ordained toward the begetting and educating of 
children and for the “equal personal dignity of wife and husband, a dignity 
acknowledged by mutual and total love.”258 Consistently, the Church de-
scribes marriage as a permanent union of one man and one woman, the 
goals of which are to beget children, provide for the mutual love and support 
of the couple, and provide a functioning home in which to raise the chil-
dren.259 
While this ideal is lived by many Americans, the cultural phenomenon 
of private-ordering has affected practicing Catholics too. For example, as 
described earlier, prior to the introduction of no-fault divorce, nearly eighty 
percent of adult Americans were married.260 But by 2009, forty years after 
no-fault divorce was introduced, the number of married Americans had 
dropped to fifty-two percent.261 The shift in the practices of American Cath-
olics was similar to the overall trend.  
[F]rom 1972 to 2010 there was a nearly 60-percent decrease in the num-
ber of marriages celebrated in the church, even as the Catholic popula-
tion grew by 17 million. The overall percentage of married Catholics al-
so dropped from 79 percent in 1972 to 53 percent in 2010. At the same 
time, the number of divorced Catholics who remarry without a church 
annulment continues to climb.262  
Commentators suggest that this shift can be traced, in part, to private-
ordering. “[W]e [American Catholics] have increasingly come to see mar-
riage as a personal matter in which children are optional, a category into 
which same-sex marriage fits quite ‘naturally.’”263  
Increasingly, and as a result of increasing private-ordering: 
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Rule-followers and rule-breakers alike tend to see their “Catholic” affili-
ation as merely tribal—thus, getting married in church becomes an ex-
pression of “family.” In this understanding, there is no sense that a larger 
social ethic underlies the commitment, that a deeper kind of belonging 
grounds the project, that there is recourse to an ultimate reality (which 
[Catholics] call “God”) that lends this very human moment some much-
needed courage and scale and resolve.264 
Furthermore, as no-fault divorce lessened the significance of marriage, the 
increasing use of assisted reproductive technology lessens the significance 
of the sexual intercourse aspect of marriage.265 Adherents of a worldview 
based in part on religion cannot help but be affected by the scope and impact 
of private-ordering opportunities. Examples abound:  
And then there’s my niece Theresa and her partner Sue, both cradle 
Catholics married “outside the church” whatever that now means. And 
their newborn twins, the “gentlemen,” as we call Jack and Michael. 
They’re here. We’re all here with them. Conceived and born in the mod-
ern medical miracle way. Emphasis on miracle. I thought we were good 
with miracles. In my family we still are. We have the proof.266  
Likewise, religious adherents, through media and through friendships, are 
exposed to an increasing number of same-sex couples who adopt children 
and experience all of the turmoil and opportunity that opposite-sex couples 
face when raising their children. These factual anomalies must be addressed 
by religious authorities prior to any successful effort to seek religious liberty 
accommodation or to successfully challenge statutes permitting same-sex 
marriage. 
Almost all of the states permitting same-sex marriage provide an ex-
emption for clergy who object to performing the solemnizations based on 
religious beliefs. Vermont, when it adopted same-sex marriage, provided: 
“This [law] does not require a member of the clergy authorized to solemnize 
a marriage . . . to solemnize any marriage, and any refusal to do so shall not 
create any civil claim or cause of action.”267 But most often the concern is 
not for the clergy, but for the religiously affiliated church or school hall, or a 
religiously motivated layman or laywoman. Few states provide comprehen-
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sive religion-based accommodation.268 Without accommodation, clergy and 
religious organizations may be subject to allegations of discrimination under 
state statutes. In addition, “[c]hurches and religious organizations that op-
pose same-sex marriage perceive a credible, palpable threat to their tax-
exempt status, the benefits of which are substantial.”269 Both state and feder-
al tax exempt status may be adversely affected. If religious organizations 
seek to exert political pressure to bring about a change in the law regarding 
issues such as same-sex marriage, their tax status as Section 501(c)(3) or-
ganizations may be adversely affected because for promoting a particular 
party or political agenda.270 
If religious adherents to a worldview that opposes same-sex marriage 
are to be effective, they must motivate their fellow adherents. Statistics sug-
gest that the majority of the Roman Catholic Church’s congregants are as 
affected by private-ordering as the general population, at least in reference 
to social issues such as divorce, marriage, adoption, and parentage.271 Any 
recourse to authority alone is not an effective option.272 What is needed is 
“honest dialogue” and a “wise and nuanced response”273 to congregants who 
are admittedly affected by media, friends, and an educational level unsur-
passed in the history of the Catholic Church in America.274 Catholic leader-
ship and other worldview adherents must honestly address the following: 
What is distinctive about a marriage based on the worldview advocated? 
Why is it better to solemnize a marriage in the context of a religious organi-
zation? What strengths will I derive? What will I have to sacrifice? Is it pos-
sible for me to fit within the parameters of the worldview? The challenges of 
family law—divorce, same-sex marriage, adoption practices, and assisted 
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reproductive technology—will continue. Commentators suggest education 
and dialogue to address the challenge.275 
[O]nly a church that learns from its own mistakes, past and present, from 
the voices of its own faithful, from its own theologians, from its various 
and disparate episcopal and ecclesial contexts, from those of other 
churches, of other faiths and of no faith, indeed from the wider human 
experiences in general, can truly teach with genuine authority.276  
The goal, it seems, is not to address the elements of the challenge fami-
ly law poses—divorce, marriage, adoption, and parentage—but rather to 
address the culture of private ordering. This is a difficult task for an advo-
cate of a worldview. The task is to convey the following:  
While the law is not indifferent to the welfare of individual members of 
society, its primary aim is to promote the common good of the ecclesial 
community as the nurturing environment in which alone individuals can 
achieve their true good. However, this good of individuals consists not in 
maximizing their temporal prosperity, happiness, or even autonomy, but 
in maximizing their virtue, both natural and supernatural.277 
IV. ADOPTION 
A. Statutory Challenge 
Adoption of an adult or a child occurs solely through statute.278 The 
first officially recognized adoption statutes originated in Hawaii in 1841, 
Mississippi in 1846, Texas in 1850, and Massachusetts in 1851.279 The earli-
est uniform statutory model was the Field Code, proposed in New York in 
1865.280 The Code was never adopted in New York, but it became the model 
for many other state adoption statutes. Unlike adoption statutes from ancient 
regimes like the Roman Empire, modern adoption statutes promoted the best 
interest of the child as the primary consideration rather than the dynastic 
prerogatives of the adopter.281 The best interest of the child remains the per-
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spective of modern adoption statues and practices.282 This is evidenced in 
the Uniform Adoption Act, first promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1953.283 Subsequent revisions 
occurred in 1969 and then in 1999.284 The Act initiated many features subse-
quently adopted by the states, such as interstate adoption, agency adoption, 
evaluations, relinquishments, petitions, and stepparent adoptions.285 
Early adoption statutes were, like marriage and divorce, based on a 
worldview formed by history and scripture.286  
The authorities are unanimous to the effect that adoption was unknown 
to the old common law of England. It was known to the Roman law, was 
attended by ceremonial dignity, and was of deep meaning and far-
reaching results. It was known to the Athenians and Spartans and was 
familiar to the writers of the New, if not the Old, Testament. It seems to 
have taken root in Egypt (Exodus II: 10). The doctrine was not unknown 
to the Babylonians—witness the Code of Hammurabi, compiled from 
2285 to 2242 B.C.287  
Even in states not influenced by the English common law, such as Hawaii, 
adoption was “a sacred relation, and having all the rights, duties and obliga-
tions of a child of the blood; and the opinion which the majority of the Court 
entertain is, that by ancient custom and usage an adopted child was an heir 
of his adopted parents.”288 Because adoption brought that child into a specif-
ic family unit, those related by adoption were prohibited from marrying, 
even though they had no genetic connection at all.289 Such a policy was 
meant to “maintain the Divine Law forbidding the marriage of close rela-
tives.”290 Any marriage involving a genetic or adopted relative was consid-
ered incestuous and a criminal offense.291 State statutes prohibiting incest 
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often were based on biblical injunctions.292 “Early American jurisprudence . 
. . applied the [state] statute . . . , which declared ‘all persons to be lawful 
that be not prohibited by God’s law to marry’ with God’s law supplied by 
the 18th chapter of the Book of Leviticus.”293 
The effect of adoption, whether the person adopted is a minor or an 
adult, is to create a legal parent-child relationship with all of the rights and 
duties pertinent to that relationship.294 Except in rare instances, a decree of 
adoption terminates the relationship between the child and the child’s for-
mer parents—ending visitation, communications, inheritance, and support. 
Then, once adopted, the adopted child is a child of the adoptive parents for 
purposes of support, custody, inheritance, and any determination of best 
interest. Only in cases of stepparent adoption,295 standby guardianship,296 or 
open adoption297 is the status arrangement modified. In each of the latter 
three statutory arrangements, the unique and very modern statutes provide 
for a continuation of the parent and child relationship with the former par-
ent. 
Historically, the public perception of the adoption process most com-
monly involved a young unwed woman voluntarily surrendering her child to 
an adoption agency. The agency, after a process of evaluation and discern-
ment would permit the infant to be adopted by a married man and woman. 
But this perception pattern has diminished with the passage of time. By the 
mid-1990s, only one percent of unmarried women voluntarily surrendered 
their child for adoption. This rate of surrender declines despite the fact that 
in 2003, more than one-third of all births in the United States occurred 
  
 292. Lowe v. Swanson, 639 F. Supp. 2d 857, 863 (N.D. Ohio 2009). 
 293. Id. (quoting State v. Barefoot, 31 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 209, 212 (S.C. Ct. App. 1845)). 
 294. In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318, 326 (Colo. 2006) (holding adoptive parents 
are protected under the Due Process Clause in the raising of their adoptive child); UNIF. 
ADOPTION ACT § 1-104, 9 pt. IA U.L.A. 23 (1999). 
 295. For step-parent adoption, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(b) (amended 2008), 8 pt. 
I U.L.A. Supp. 68–69 (Supp. 2010): “A parent child relationship exists between an individual 
who is adopted by the spouse of either genetic parent and: (1) the genetic parent whose 
spouse adopted the individual; and (2) the other genetic parent, but only for the purpose of 
the right of the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inherit from or through the other 
genetic parent.” Nearly half of all adoptions in the United States are stepparent adoptions. See 
ROSE M. KREIDER, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN: 2000  2 n.4 (2003). 
 296. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-901 to 13-908 (West 2002) (provid-
ing guardianship of a minor or a minor’s property upon the consent, death, or incapacity of a 
minor’s parent). 
 297. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35 (West Supp. 2012) (permitting the former 
parents and the adopted child to maintain contact after the adoption has been finalized). For 
commentary, see CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GETAWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., OPENNESS IN ADOPTION (Feb. 2003), 
available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/f_openadopt.pdf. 
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among unmarried women.298 This pattern is not unique. Perhaps the discrep-
ancy between single mother births and a decline in the surrender of infants 
for adoption may be explained by the fact that fewer teenage women are 
having babies. Between 1970 and 2003, the ratio of births to teenage women 
has decreased from sixty-eight to forty-two births per thousand.299 It is likely 
that the availability of contraception and abortion accounts for the decrease. 
Nevertheless, many single mothers of all ages are keeping their babies, per-
haps because of a combination of greater societal acceptance of single par-
ents and an individual maternal desire to simply raise the child on their own. 
While the number of children voluntarily surrendered into the adoption 
process decreased, the number of children involuntarily removed from their 
parents and placed in some form of dependency care increased. A child is 
classified as dependent whenever there is no parent able or willing to care 
for the child.300 This necessitates the child being temporarily placed with 
relatives or in an institution, such as foster care or a home for children. Most 
often, a child lacks a capable parent because of abuse, neglect, or abandon-
ment. When this happens, the state, in almost all situations, must provide 
services to the parent to correct the harm.301 The state may remove the child 
if there is a preponderance of evidence of neglect or abuse.302 Then, at a 
hearing, the state must provide clear and convincing evidence of the parent’s 
conduct that adversely affects the child.303 If the state is successful, the child 
remains in state care and the parent must be provided with services to cor-
rect the problem. But if the parent does not cooperate with services, or the 
harm is very severe, then the state may involuntarily terminate the parent’s 
rights to the child.304 Termination of the parental rights requires clear and 
convincing evidence and is often a tortuously lengthy process. 
Nearly 500,000 children are in some type of dependency care in the 
United States.305 The state will return some of these children to their parents, 
  
 298. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF 
WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN 18–44 YEARS OF AGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2002, VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, SERIES 23, NO. 27, at 34 (2008); 
Brady E. Hamilton et al., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Births: Preliminary 
Data for 2003, 53 NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPORTS 9, Nov. 6, 2004, at 1.  
 299. Hamilton et al., supra note 298, at 2 fig.2. 
 300. WILLIAM G. JONES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., WORKING WITH THE 
COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION 84 (2006), 
available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/courts/appenda.cfm. 
 301. Id. at 23–40. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION—
FY 2002–FY 2011 (Jul. 12, 2012),  
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends_fostercare_adoption.pdf.  
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but nearly 180,000 will eventually become eligible for adoption because of 
termination of parental rights.306 When Congress adopted the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act of 1997,307 all states had to petition the courts for termina-
tion of parental rights if the child spent fifteen out of twenty-two consecu-
tive months in dependency care. The goal of the Act was to decrease the 
amount of time a child spends in dependency care, which is temporary and 
offers little stability. However, the Act increased the number of termination 
proceedings, resulting in the unintended consequence of more children be-
coming available for adoption. 
In addition to the children whose parents have lost their parental rights, 
other children are placed for adoption because they are special-needs chil-
dren having various illnesses, psychological or physical disabilities, or man-
ifesting severe behavioral problems. In 2002, about sixty percent of unrelat-
ed adoptions were of special needs children.308 Some states provide subsi-
dized adoptions of children with special needs.309 Virginia’s statute defines a 
special-needs child as one with the following conditions: (1) “[p]hysical, 
mental, or emotional condition[s] existing prior to adoption;” (2) a predispo-
sition to develop health issues leading to “substantial risk of future disabil-
ity;” and (3) “individual circumstances . . . related to age, racial or ethnic 
background or a close relationship with one or more siblings.”310 The state 
provides various incentives to adopt.311 In addition to a subsidy, the adopters 
will receive reimbursement for any fees or other expenses related to the 
adoption, legal expenses included.312 State assistance ceases when the child 
with special-needs reaches eighteen years-of-age, but if the child has handi-
caps that necessitate continuation of payments, then the payments may con-
tinue until the child reaches the age of twenty-one.313 Additionally, the fed-
eral government provides incentives for those willing to adopt children who 
are hard to place.314 The hope is that financial incentives will enable a family 
  
 306. Id. 
 307. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 & 42 U.S.C.); see generally Richard Wexler, Take the 
Child and Run: How ASFA and the Mentality Behind It Harm Children, 13 UDC/DCSL L. 
REV. 435 (2010). 
 308. Paul Placek, National Adoption Data, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK IV, at 8 (Thomas C. 
Atwood et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.adoptioncouncil.org/images/stones/documents/adoptionfactbookiv1.pdf.   
 309. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-1300 to 63.2-1304 (2007) (stating that financial 
assistance to the adoptive parent continues until the child reaches eighteen, or twenty-one 
under special circumstances). 
 310. Id. § 63.2-1300. 
 311. Id. § 63.2-1301. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id.  
 314. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-272, 94 Stat. 
500 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–628(b), 670–679(b) (2006 & Supp. V 
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to adopt a child and thus provide the child with a permanent placement. As 
an added incentive to promote adoptions, the federal government provides 
an income tax credit for adoptive parents.315 Despite state and federal efforts, 
only about 50,000 children are adopted out of the foster care system each 
year, leaving a significant number without permanent placements until they 
age-out of the system entirely.316  
State and federal efforts to promote adoption of children placed in state 
foster homes and related institutions illustrate the dramatic need to place 
children in permanent homes and out of institutional care settings. The need 
to place children has provided an incentive for states and private agencies to 
become more lenient in permitting foster parents to adopt their foster chil-
dren.317 Recall that foster parents are paid by the state to provide children 
with temporary homes; traditionally, foster parents were prevented from 
bonding with the children through frequent moves from one foster home to 
another. Nonetheless today, statistics indicate that of all the children who 
were adopted in 2006, fifty-nine percent of children in foster care were 
adopted by their foster parents in 2006. Additionally, some children are be-
ing adopted by temporary foster parents of sorts. Typically, the state has 
been placing children with relatives of the parent waiting for a determination 
of parental rights.318 A few courts even allow a presumption, or a priority 
status, to relatives when they seek to adopt a child.319 This too is a radical 
departure from what occurred in the not too distant past.320 
Generally, most adoption agencies prefer heterosexual, married couples 
with a stable economic history that seem suitable for promoting the best 
  
2011)); Protecting Incentives for the Adoption of Children with Special Needs Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-20, 123 Stat. 1616 (2009). 
 315. 26 U.S.C. §§ 23, 137 (2006); see generally James M. Puckett, Rethinking Tax Prior-
ities: Marriage Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1409 
(2010). 
 316. However, some states provide for long-term foster care assistance. See VA. CODE 
ANN. § 63.2-908 (2007). 
 317. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
AFCARS REPORT 14 (2008), 
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcars_report14.pdf. A number of 
courts have permitted foster parent adoption when it was in the best interest of the child. See 
Knight v. Deavers, 259 Ark. 45, 531 S.W.2d 252 (1976); C.S. v. S.H., 671 So.2d 260 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 318. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GETAWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS., OPENNESS IN ADOPTION (Feb. 2003), available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/f_openadopt.pdf. 
 319. See Clark Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 167 P.3d 922 (Nev. 
2007); see also, FLA. STAT. § 63.0425 (2005 & Supp. 2008) (creating a preference for a rela-
tive when the child has resided with the relative for six months or more).  
 320. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 
(1977) (holding that foster parents lack a due process right to custody of a child when the 
state removes the child from foster care). 
60 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
interest of the child. Suitability may include matching the child’s religious 
beliefs with the adoptive parents.321 Adoption agencies can consider reli-
gious beliefs of the adopters as long as the belief is perceived as being in the 
best interest of the child.322 States routinely prohibit agencies from denying 
any person the right to adopt a child based on race, color, or national 
origin.323 Presumptively, the preferential couple being married and hetero-
sexual would conform to the worldview advocated by religious persons and 
organizations. And religious agencies will restrict their adoptive couples to 
this model when state statutes allow it. There are fewer of these couples 
today, which presumably corresponds to the expanding number of children 
needing permanent homes. Thus, the need to place children has necessitated 
looking beyond preferred form families. Persons heretofore denied the op-
portunity to adopt—due to prohibitive state or institution profile guide-
lines—have challenged any agency limitations by asserting constitutional 
guarantees. As a result of these factors, today single persons,324 gay and les-
bian persons and couples,325 older persons, and disabled persons are able to 
adopt children.326 One study reported that sixty percent of public and private 
adoption agencies permit adoption by same-sex couples; approximately four 
percent of adopted children in the United States are being raised in same-sex 
households.327 
  
 321. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709(a) (West 2011) (amended 2012) (“The department 
or licensed adoption agency to which a child has been freed for adoption by either relin-
quishment or termination of parental rights may consider the child’s religious background in 
determining an appropriate placement.”); see also Carl E. Schneider, Religion and Child 
Custody, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 879 (1992). 
 322. See, e.g., In re Dickens v. Ernesto, 281 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1972) (providing an ex-
ample of religious beliefs being considered for adoption determinations). Note that other 
factors like race may not be considered for adoption purposes. 
 323. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (a)(1) (2004); Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Ra-
cial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1415 (2006). But see 25 U.S.C. § 1915 
(2006) (specifying an exemption for Native Americans). 
 324. See generally W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing Up Baby: 
Adoption, Marriage, and the Best Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 883 
(2006).  
 325. Jason C. Beekman, Note, Same-Sex Second Parent Adoption and Intestacy Law: 
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Uniform Probate Code, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 139 (2010); see, e.g., Adoption of M.A., 930 
A.2d 1088 (Me. 2007) (permitting two unmarried same-sex persons to petition to adopt chil-
dren because it was in the best interest of the children to be adopted).  
 326. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 48.82(5) (2011) (specifying that any person otherwise quali-
fied, may not be prevented from adopting a child because the person is deaf, blind, or has 
other physical handicaps). 
 327. Jeanne Howard, Expanding Resources for Children: Is Adoption by Gays and Lesbi-
ans Part of the Answer for Boys and Girls Who Need Homes?, ADOPTION INSTITUTE 11 
(2006), available at 
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Agencies affiliated with religious organizations may not, because of re-
ligious objections, permit same-sex couples to adopt children.328 The same-
sex couples may be presumed to be having an intimate sexual relationship. 
The religious agency, considering any sexual relationship outside of mar-
riage as a sinful act and not in the best interest of a child, will deny the cou-
ple the right to adopt. If challenged by the prospective adopters, the agency 
will assert a Free Exercise right to refuse, arguing that gay and lesbian adop-
tive parents would not be in the best interest of the child since that child 
would be raised in an immoral household. The fact that same-sex couples 
may be married in a state permitting such marriages, or may be in a civil 
union or domestic partnership is irrelevant. The religious agency refusing 
them the right to adopt would not recognize any same-sex relationship in-
volving intimacy as valid. 
When a religious agency refuses to place a child for adoption with 
same-sex couples, it risks violating various constitutional guarantees or state 
statutes affording protection to such persons. As discussed previously in 
reference to same-sex marriage, arguments may be made in reference to 
Equal Protection, Due Process, the right to privacy, and freedom of associa-
tion. In rare instances, rather than protecting the right of all persons to adopt, 
states prohibited same-sex couples from adopting children within their bor-
ders. Until late in 2008, Florida prohibited gay and lesbian couples from 
adopting children.329 The state statute was ruled unconstitutional on the basis 
of Equal Protection due to the state’s inability to provide a rational basis for 
denying gay and lesbian persons and couples adoption rights.330 
In Doe, the state presented familiar arguments as to why homosexuals 
should not be able to adopt children—principally arguing that prohibition 
was rational because heterosexuals are better equipped to be parents.331 That 
is, homosexual parents are more prone to various disorders resulting in more 
violence and earlier death.332 The state’s expert witness, Dr. George Rekers, 
asked to testify in support of this position, relied heavily on a worldview 




 328. Adoption in this section refers to any adoption by same-sex couples, when they are 
seeking to adopt together as a couple. Omitted is any discussion of an adoption of a child by 
one partner in a same-sex relationship. For an example of the issues involved in an adoption 
by one person in a same-sex relationship, see Chatterjee v. King, 253 P.3d 915 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2010), rev’d, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012); see also Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 
554 (Cal. 2003). 
 329. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2008) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute 
may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”). 
 330. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008). 
 331. Id. at *6–12. 
 332. Id. 
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God has given us explicit instruction as to what his moral laws are. The 
psychologist who recommends that a person simply define his own sex-
ual values ends up not being an advocate of human freedom, instead he 
becomes a revolutionary, attempting to overthrow the moral laws of 
God. Instead of being helped, the client is therefore led down a fanciful 
path of alleged morality called, quote, liberation.333  
The court rejected this as a sufficient rational basis, holding that “it is clear 
that sexual orientation is not a predictor of a person’s ability to parent. Sex-
ual orientation no more leads to psychiatric disorders, alcohol and substance 
abuse, relationship instability, a lower life expectancy or sexual disorders 
than race, gender, socioeconomic class or any other demographic character-
istic.”334 This holding effectively eliminated the ban on homosexuals adopt-
ing children in Florida.  
In a second case, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that a state statute 
forbidding adoption by unmarried persons violated the privacy rights of a 
same-sex couple.335 Relying upon the Arkansas Constitution, the court de-
manded that the state provide a compelling state interest, rather than a ra-
tional basis, because of the statute’s substantial and direct burden on the 
couple’s privacy rights.336 Because the statute involved a fundamental right 
to engage in intimate consensual activity, it had to be justified by a height-
ened level of scrutiny.337 The court ruled that the statute forced the couple to 
choose between engaging in intimate sexual activity and adopting a 
child338—an impermissible choice.339 To force a couple to choose between 
adopting and engaging in intimate contact is impermissible without demon-
strating a compelling state interest.340 In a manner similar to the Florida de-
cision, the state argued that its statute was justified because unmarried cou-
ples were more likely to suffer domestic abuse, and furthermore, the 
  
 333. Id. at *12 n.25 (quoting MICHAEL BRAWN & GEORGE REKERS, THE CHRISTIAN IN AN 
AGE OF SEXUAL ECLIPSE 14 (1981)). 
 334. Id. at *20–21; see generally Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family 
Policy Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y. & L. 291, 319–29 (2001); AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC 
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 337. Id. at 19–20, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
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 339. Id. at 14, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 340. See id. at 19, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
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nonmarital relationship lacked the social support necessary to raising a 
child.341 Rejecting those arguments, the court held that these factors may be 
addressed in the screening of applicants and do not provide a compelling 
state interest.342 
The constitutional arguments provided by the Florida and Arkansas 
courts are illustrative of the arguments likely to arise in the future when 
states seek to impose barriers to adoption by gay and lesbian persons or 
couples. Equal Protection and the constitutional guarantee of liberty an-
nounced in Lawrence are formidable hurdles to overcome, especially when 
increasing numbers of couples are seeking to adopt children coupled with a 
corresponding increase in the number of children seeking permanent 
homes.343 Anticipating a challenge similar to what occurred in Florida and 
Arkansas, some states repealed statutes that prohibited gay and lesbian per-
sons from adopting children.344 The challenge to religious liberty is to be 
able to restrict the adoption of children to couples who fit within the 
worldview they espouse without violating Constitutional and statutory pro-
tections. 
B. Worldview Response 
Religious persons and organizations often provide emergency and more 
permanent care to children abandoned, neglected, abused, or surrendered by 
parents. It is logical then that many of these same persons and organizations 
would seek to facilitate finding the children a permanent home with loving 
parents. Nonetheless, same-sex parents involved in homosexual activity are 
classified by some religious organizations as “intrinsically disordered” and 
“contrary to the natural law.”345 And thus, persons who engage in homosex-
ual acts should not be permitted to adopt a child, even though homosexuals 
“must be accepted with respect, compassion, and sensitivity. Every sign of 
unjust discrimination in their regard should be avoided.”346 While the two 
statements may seem contradictory, they must be viewed in the context of a 
worldview that defines marriage as between a man and a woman, a union 
  
 341. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 21–22, ___ S.W.3d at ___.  
 342. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
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Macomber-Chambers-Final-Adoption-Report-Mar-2007.pdf.  
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 346. Id. 
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that is the primary mode of procreation and the rearing of children. Sexual 
activity outside of the context of this worldview is a sin and the best interest 
of the child precludes purposely placing the child in such a home. If the 
state, through statute or by the constitution, forces the religious agency to 
place a child in such a home, it is a coercive act and one that should be pro-
hibited by a right to Free Exercise. 
The issue of Free Exercise and adoption rights of same-sex couples 
arose in San Francisco.347 A group of Roman Catholics and a Roman Catho-
lic advocacy group sought to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the 
city, county, and individual members of the Board of Supervisors of San 
Francisco (“Board”).348 The petitioners argued that the Board’s non-binding 
resolution opposing a Vatican-issued Church directive infringed upon their 
religious liberty.349 The Vatican ordered the Archdiocese to stop placing 
children in need of adoption with homosexual households.350 The Board 
issued a reactive city resolution urging the Vatican to withdraw the “dis-
criminatory and defamatory directive.”351 Specifically, this resolution de-
scribed the Vatican directive as “an insult to all San Franciscans when a 
foreign country, like the Vatican, meddles with and attempts to negatively 
influence this great City’s existing and established customs and traditions 
such as the right of same-sex couples to adopt and care for children in 
need.”352 The Catholic petitioners responded by asserting that the Establish-
ment Clause was infringed by the Board’s action.353 That is, the resolution 
interfered in a religious matter, violating the separation of church and state. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled against 
the Catholic petitioners, holding that the Board’s action did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.354 A violation would only occur when government 
departs from strict neutrality;355 the Board’s action was based on secular 
principles, not theological. Whether same-sex couples may adopt a child in 
San Francisco is a matter with secular political ramifications important to 
the Board’s constituents.356 Therefore, when the Board issued the resolution, 
the criticism of the Vatican directive was a purely secular matter not involv-
ing religious traditions or ceremonies.357 
  
 347. Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043 (9th 
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Left with no alternatives but to allow same-sex couples the right to 
adopt a child, religious agencies may cease to provide adoption services. 
Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Boston, for example, ceased to 
provide adoption services when the state prohibited any discrimination 
against gay and lesbian adopters.358 Even though subject to constitutional 
attack, another option would be to seek an accommodation in the state’s 
adoption statute, excusing the religious provider from complying with the 
state’s non-discrimination policy. North Dakota has an extensive accommo-
dation statute that provides the following: 
A child-placing agency is not required to perform, assist, counsel, rec-
ommend, facilitate, refer, or participate in a placement that violates the 
agency’s written religious or moral convictions or policies. A state or lo-
cal government entity may not deny a child-placing agency any grant, 
contract, or participation in a government program because of the child-
placing agency’s objection to performing, assisting, counseling, recom-
mending, facilitating, referring, or participating in a placement that vio-
lates the child-placing agency’s written religious or moral convictions or 
policies. Refusal by a child-placing agency to perform, assist, counsel, 
recommend, facilitate, refer, or participate in a placement that violates 
the child-placing agency’s written religious or moral convictions or poli-
cies does not constitute a determination that the proposed adoption is not 
in the best interest of the child.359 
A third option for religious agencies refusing to place children with 
same-sex couples involves litigation. This is an expensive option. As dis-
cussed in connection with the Florida and Arkansas decisions, justifying any 
refusal to allow same-sex couples to adopt would be difficult. It is unlikely 
that courts would permit the agency to refuse same-sex couples based solely 
on religious liberty or Free Exercise grounds. The Florida decision permit-
ting same-sex couples to adopt was based on Equal Protection, a formidable 
hurdle even when the court only requires a rational reason for the prohibi-
tion. The inability of the state to justify refusal at the lowest level of scrutiny 
is a good predictor of how a court would rule on a religious agency’s right to 
refuse adoption to same-sex couples. The Arkansas decision went beyond 
Equal Protection, holding that couples should have to choose between 
adopting children and having an intimate physical relationship. The court’s 
  
 358. See Jerry Filteau, Catholic Charities in Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Ser-
vices, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 13, 2006), 
http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0601456.htm. 
 359. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-07.1 (2011). Virginia is considering enacting a similar 
policy. See Anita Kuman, Adoption Overall Seen as Anti-Gay, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2012, at 
B1. 
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reliance upon Lawrence v. Texas360 is illustrative of the extent of private-
ordering. In Lawrence, the Court overturned a state anti-sodomy statute, 
holding that the state may not criminalize intimate contact between consent-
ing adults, whether married or single, heterosexual or homosexual.361 Such a 
right to intimate contact is grounded in the liberty interest guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause:  
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from 
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual life-
style. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The 
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making 
their private sexual conduct a crime.362  
This approach requires the state to provide a compelling interest justifying 
restrictions on same-sex couples.363 The Arkansas court held that the state, 
even under its own constitution, had not met this burden. While many arti-
cles have been written about Lawrence, applying its rationale to same-sex 
adoption provides further constitutional protection to same-sex couples 
seeking to privately order their own lives.  
Permitting same-sex couples to adopt children is part of the private-
ordering prevalent in society. It is also a reaction to the need to provide 
permanent homes for many children removed from abusive families. The 
process is a familiar one: first there is a need and then there is a response. 
This was first illustrated during the discussion of no-fault divorce then later, 
during the discussion of the evolution of nonmarital cohabitation to same-
sex marriage. All three are products of the culture of private-ordering. And 
each of these three, divorce, marriage, and adoption, are posing challenges 
to the religious liberty of persons advocating a specific worldview. Allowing 
same-sex couples to adopt has an impact on same-sex marriage because it 
deprives worldview advocates of the parentage argument. That is, marriage 
is the means by which children are procreated. And of course, marriage is 
defined as one man and one woman able to engage in sexual intercourse, but 
same-sex adoption allows for procreation to occur other than in marriage. 
With the technological advances in assisted reproductive technology, par-
  
 360. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that 
the state may not single out homosexuals from the Equal Protection of the law); see generally 
Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for 
Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010); Marsh B. Freeman, Their Love Is Here to Stay: 
Why the Supreme Court Cannot Turn Back the Hands of Time, 17 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 
1 (2010). 
 361. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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entage may be established far beyond the parameters of opposite-sex mar-
riage.  
V. PARENTAGE 
A. Statutory Challenge 
Fifty years ago, the sole means by which a child could be conceived 
was through sexual intercourse.364 Most often, the man and woman engaging 
in intercourse were married and the birth of the child brought about parent-
age and all of its accompanying duties and benefits. But in 1978, Louise 
Brown became the first baby conceived in a test tube.365 An egg was surgi-
cally removed from the mother and fertilized with the father’s sperm in a 
test tube. For the first time, human conception occurred in a laboratory. 
Once the embryo was formed, it was implanted in the mother’s uterus, and 
the mother carried the baby to term and delivery. This process of conception 
and birth became known as in-vitro fertilization and precipitated a dramatic 
change in the manner in which parentage is established. Today, there are 
additional means by which conception may occur. And whenever concep-
tion occurs through means other than intercourse, birth occurs through as-
sisted reproduction. 
The Uniform Parentage Act includes five ways by which pregnancy 
can occur outside of sexual intercourse: (1) intrauterine insemination; (2) 
donation of eggs; (3) donation of embryos; (4) in-vitro fertilization and 
transfer of embryos; and (5) intracytoplasmic sperm injection.366 These 
technological possibilities exist for nearly everyone—including every possi-
ble combination of heterosexual and homosexual persons, single, married, 
or merely cohabitating. Any of these persons may use his or her own genetic 
material as part of the process. Alternatively, the person or couple may use 
donor sperm and eggs from qualified donors. As a result of assisted repro-
duction, adults may become parents without recourse to sexual intercourse, 
  
 364. Artificial insemination has been used on animals for centuries, but human use in the 
United States did not gain acceptance until the middle of the twentieth century. See generally, 
Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 284–85 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 365. See generally Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technologi-
cal Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 509–10 
(2005) (providing information on in-vitro fertilization and Louise Brown). 
 366. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 303 (2001); see gener-
ally Deborah L. Forman, When “Bad” Mothers Make Worse Law: A Critique of Legislative 
Limits on Embryo Transfer, 14 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273 (2011); Kerry Lynn Macin-
tosh, Brave New Eugenics: Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the Name of 
Better Babies, 2010 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 257; Moses, supra note 365, at 505; Brad J. 
Reich & Dawn Swink, Outsourcing Human Reproduction: Embryos & Surrogacy Services in 
the Cyberprocreation Era, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 241 (2011). 
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which is of great significance to same-sex couples. Couples and persons 
may conceive a child inside or outside of marriage, even after the death of 
either or both of the genetic donors through posthumous conception.367 
States are slowly responding to advances in technology and adopting stat-
utes that seek to establish parentage within the increasing opportunities pro-
vided by assisted reproductive technology.368 
The number of users of assisted reproductive technology, for couples 
and individuals, has increased dramatically in the United States. According 
to the Centers for Disease Control, assisted reproductive technology was 
responsible for slightly more than one percent of all births occurring in 
2009.369 That year, there were a total of 60,190 infants born from assisted 
reproductive technology, more than double the number born in 1996.370 And 
the largest group using the procedures available was women younger than 
thirty-five.371 Increases in the number of persons and couples utilizing as-
sisted reproductive technology prompt concerns about establishing paternity 
and maternity;372 ownership of sperm, eggs, and preembryos entrusted to 
fertility clinics; and how best to regulate these clinics and address the myri-
ad of ethical and moral questions they engender.373 Because of the involve-
ment of human conception, persons and organizations have expressed grave 
concerns over all aspects of assisted reproduction.374 
  
 367. See generally Raymond C. O’Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A 
Model Act, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 332 (2009). 
 368. Id. at 339 (suggesting a possible statute to establish paternity and maternity in the 
context of posthumous conception).  
 369. 2004 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL (Dec. 2006), 15, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2009. 
 370. Id. at 57. 
 371. Id. at 40. 
 372. Because assisted reproductive technology allows for egg donations and surrogacy, 
establishing maternity is an issue now, whereas previously only the issue of paternity was in 
doubt.  
 373. See, e.g., Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007) (enforcing a private 
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CARDOZO L. REV. 2283 (2007).  
 374. See HELEN ALVARÉ, U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE FAMILY (2007), available at http://old.usccb.org/prolife/programs/rlp/ 
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465 (1983). 
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There are a number of state and federal decisions addressing concerns 
about the process. Despite criticism, assisted reproduction is protected under 
constitutional guarantees of privacy, liberty, and due process. In one of the 
first cases to address the issue of constitutional protection, a California court 
held that the decisional authority of the adult donor and the adult donee of 
the gametes must be protected, regardless of any form of marital status.375 It 
would seem that more recent interpretations of constitutional guarantees 
would establish a right to assisted reproductive technologies under the ra-
tionale of Lawrence v. Texas, which specifically guarantees that adults have 
a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to engage in conduct free from unwarranted state interference.376 As 
technology continues to advance and states become more adept at legislating 
parentage, clinic safeguards, and custody arrangements, there will be fewer 
judicial controversies. At the same time, undoubtedly, the number of per-
sons utilizing assisted reproduction will continue to increase. 
Amidst the boom in reproductive technology, there arises the challenge 
to persons and organizations sharing the belief that human conception 
should be reserved to sexual intercourse between a married man and wom-
an. The significant desire of persons and couples to parent a child makes the 
challenge a formidable one. Through assisted reproductive technology and 
adoption, single persons, nonmarital cohabitants of the same or opposite-
sex, and married same-sex couples may now become parents. Thus, a 
worldview arguing that same-sex marriage should be prohibited because of 
the inability to procreate falters due to statutory adoption or assisted repro-
duction. Increasingly, proponents of a worldview arguing against same-sex 
marriage must rely upon the unique and historical importance of sexual in-
tercourse as the only means by which parentage may occur. Such arguments, 
however, offend those seeking to become parents by utilizing their capacity 
to private-order their lives.  
Advances in statutory adoption and assisted reproductive technology 
now make available four means to bring about parentage: (1) sexual inter-
course conception; (2) statutory adoption; (3) compliance with statutes gov-
erning artificial insemination; and (4) valid gestational agreements. Obvi-
  
 375. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 289 (Ct. App. 1993) (sustaining the 
rights of an unmarried donor and a donee to transfer sperm during life and at death); see also 
Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Rights and Obligations Resulting from Human Artificial 
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ously, sexual intercourse conception, especially when the parents are mar-
ried, presents no challenge to advocates of a worldview based partly on reli-
gion. Challenges posed by same-sex couples adopting have been discussed 
above. Thus, the challenge of valid gestational agreements will be discussed 
next, followed by compliance with artificial insemination statutes. These 
two developments in family law now permit same-sex couples to become 
parents. 
1. Gestational Agreements 
The Uniform Probate Code defines a gestational agreement as “an en-
forceable or unenforceable agreement for assisted reproduction in which a 
woman agrees to carry a child to birth for an intended parent, intended par-
ents, or an individual described in subsection (e).”377 From biblical times 
until the present, single persons and couples have contracted with women to 
carry a child to term for them. Among same-sex couples, especially males, 
the practice is common; the men often provide the sperm and the surrogate 
contracts to bear their child. Not every state permits surrogacy contracts. 
Usually, refusal is based on public policy reasons—principally that the 
payment of money to a surrogate in return for a child is degrading to women 
and often violates laws prohibiting the use of money in connection with 
adoptions.378 In 1988, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a surroga-
cy contract between a married man and woman that provided the surrogate 
would become pregnant using the man’s sperm.379 The contract specified 
that the surrogate would carry the child to term, and then upon birth, she 
would deliver the child to the married couple and cooperate with them in 
both the termination of her rights in the child and the married couple’s sub-
sequent adoption.380 In return for her services, the couple agreed to pay her 
$10,000.381 
When the child was born, the surrogate refused to comply with the 
terms of the contract, concluding that she could not surrender the child be-
  
 377. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, § 2-121(a)(1) (amended 2011), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. Supp. 76–79 
(Supp. 2010). Subsection (e), referenced in the definition, refers to posthumous conception—
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 378. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246–48 (N.J. 1988). Subsequent New Jersey 
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surrogate with the wife’s consent. See In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386 (N.J. App. Ct. 2011), cert. 
granted, 23 A.3d 935 (N.J. 2011). 
 379. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234. 
 380. Id. at 1235.  
 381. Id.  
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cause it was her own.382 The couple filed suit for enforcement of the contract 
and a very public struggle ensued during which the baby was taken from the 
surrogate and given to the couple, only to be returned to the surrogate upon 
a final appeal made to the New Jersey Supreme Court.383 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court concluded that the contract violated the state’s public policy 
and was therefore unenforceable.384 The surrogate was entitled to keep the 
baby.385 But because the husband’s sperm was used in the conception of the 
child, he was also a parent to the child. This status allowed him to file for 
custody.386 In making a determination of custody, the court used the test of 
what would be in the best interest of the child, awarding the husband physi-
cal custody and the surrogate eight hours of unsupervised visitation per 
week.387 As a result of this arrangement, the couple who had hired the surro-
gate was able to raise the child. This did not occur because of the gestational 
contract but rather because of the custody determination.  
Not all states consider gestational contracts as violative of public poli-
cy. Ohio, for example, looked to the fact that adult parties all signed a con-
tract and there was no stated policy announced by the legislature that would 
prevent the enforcement of the contract.388 Based on this, the state’s highest 
court ruled that when a woman signed a gestational contract agreeing to be 
artificially inseminated with another woman’s fertilized egg, she should be 
found in breach of contract if she violates its terms.389  
Today, gestational agreements often involve persons of the same-sex 
seeking to become parents. For example, in 2007, two married men entered 
into a written gestational contract with a woman who agreed to act as their 
surrogate, a gestational carrier under the terms of the contract.390 She was 
implanted with embryos formed from donor eggs and the sperm of one of 
the two men.391 Much like the New Jersey case, the surrogate here agreed to 
surrender the child or children upon birth, proceed with termination of her 
parental rights, and cooperate with the men in replacing the original birth 
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 383. Id. at 1237–38.  
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72 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
certificates.392 The surrogate had served as a gestational carrier for the men 
previously, and all of the parties felt confident in the arrangement.393  
In April 2008, the surrogate gave birth to twins, and the two men, with 
her cooperation, requested the court to find the gestational agreement valid 
and to order the Department of Public Health to issue the replacement birth 
certificate.394 Because one of the men had contributed sperm for the concep-
tion, he was a genetic parent.395 The issue, however, concerned the other 
man’s parental rights and terminating the parental rights of the gestational 
carrier.396 The court quickly concluded that the gestational carrier had no 
parental right but spent more time discussing the parental rights of the man 
who did not donate sperm.397 In other words, the question became whether 
the second man, the one who had no genetic connection with the twins, 
could acquire parental rights through a valid gestational agreement.398 The 
court concluded that the state’s statute permitting the enforceability of a 
gestational agreement also permits a person who has no genetic or adoptive 
relationship with the child to become a parent to that child.399 Thus, the court 
held that parentage may result without a genetic connection because the 
party to the agreement is an intended parent. The gestational agreement 
made the non-genetic man a parent of the child.400 The significance of the 
court’s decision is that a gestational agreement can confer parentage status, 
placing it on a par with sexual intercourse conception, artificial insemina-
tion, and adoption.  
Not all states permit gestational contracts.401 Those that do require all 
of the parties involved meet defined minimum standards.402 For example, the 
Uniform Parentage Act requires the following prior to establishing the valid-
ity of the agreement: (1) the prospective gestational carrier, her husband if 
she is married, a donor or the donors, and the intended parents must execute 
a written agreement; (2) the agreement specifies that only artificial insemi-
nation may bring about conception, not intercourse; (3) reasonable compen-
sation may be paid to the surrogate for her services; (4) the agreement may 
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 402. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.11–742.15 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 
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provide for payment of added consideration, but some states specify that the 
consideration be limited to reasonable living, legal, medical, psychological, 
and psychiatric expenses of the surrogate that are directly related to the 
pregnancy;403 (5) the agreement may not limit the gestational carrier’s deci-
sion related to her health or that of the embryos or fetus; and (6) a court may 
declare the intended parents as the parents of the surrogate’s child or chil-
dren if residency was properly established, only reasonable compensation 
was paid, and all of the parties have voluntarily entered into the agree-
ment.404 
Increasingly, same-sex couples utilize gestational carriers to bring 
about parentage. Most often, the facts are identical to the ones recited in the 
Raftopol decision.  
2. Artificial Insemination Statutes 
Assisted reproductive technology has provided same-sex couples with 
the ability to become parents; this development occurred long before the 
introduction of same-sex marriage. Once two adults became partners or 
spouses, their thoughts then turned to becoming parents, and they often 
failed to establish a legal basis for parentage. Their focus was always on 
becoming parents together, regardless of who contributed the genetic mate-
rial that brought about the resulting child. But state parentage statutes equat-
ed parenthood with a genetic link to the child, which was sometimes lack-
ing. In addition, adoption by the nonmarital partner proved to be inadequate. 
That is, some states required the genetic parent to relinquish his or her bio-
logical child in order to have the child adopted by someone else.405 Because 
the couple could not marry, it was impossible to establish a step-parent 
adoption. There were some exceptions. Some states permitted the same-sex 
partner to have his or her name listed on the child’s birth certificate as a 
parent without requiring the genetic parent to relinquish the child. What 
follows is a summary of when this has traditionally occurred. 
  
 403. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(4) (West 2010). 
 404. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 801–809 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 362–78 (2001); see 
also UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT §§ 1–16, 9C U.L.A. 368–86 
(2001) (providing two alternatives for states to follow, either rejecting gestational contracts or 
permitting them). 
 405. See e.g., In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Neb. 2002) (refusing to 
allow genetic mother’s partner to adopt child unless mother relinquished her parental rights). 
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a. Marriage 
As same-sex marriage became available, so have the parentage pre-
sumptions that occur because of marriage. For example, the Uniform Par-
entage Act provides that a man is presumed to be the father of a child if he 
and the mother of the child are married to each other, and the child is born 
during the marriage.406 Likewise, if a man and a woman are married to one 
another and a child is born within 300 days of the dissolution of the mar-
riage; or before or after the birth of the child, the mother and the man were 
married, then the man is presumed to be the father of the child even if the 
marriage is subsequently declared invalid for any reason.407 The fact that the 
statute refers to opposite-sex persons does not detract from the point that 
marriage of spouses, regardless of gender, provides a presumption of 
parenthood. 
An illustration of the parentage presumption applying to same-sex mar-
riage occurred in Iowa. In 2006, two women participated in a state sanc-
tioned commitment ceremony, and the following year, one of the women 
gave birth to a son who was conceived through in vitro fertilization brought 
about with anonymous donor sperm.408 The non-genetically connected 
woman adopted her partner’s son, and her name was registered on the 
child’s birth certificate as the child’s parent together with the genetic moth-
er-parent.409 The women had one more child and followed the same proce-
dure.410 But by then, Iowa had enacted same-sex marriage and the two wom-
en had in fact married under the new statutory procedure.411 Subsequent to 
their marriage, one of the women gave birth to a third child and had her 
name listed as the mother.412 The issue arose as to whether the non-
genetically related spouse had to now adopt the child, as she had done prior 
to the enactment of same-sex marriage, in order to have her name listed on 
the birth certificate as well.413 The women argued that the spouse with no 
genetic connection should not be required to adopt the child since she was 
the spouse of the genetic parent.414 The court agreed, holding that even 
though the state’s parentage statute referred to male and female spouses, the 
statute should be read in a gender neutral fashion.415 Thus, when the two 
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women married, the birth of a child to one of them created a presumption of 
parenthood in the other.416 This presumption entitled both women to have 
their names on the child’s birth certificate without the necessity of adoption 
by the spouse who had no genetic connection with the child.417  
b. Presumed Parent 
In addition to marriage, the Uniform Parentage Act provides another 
presumption of parentage applicable to same-sex couples.418 The Act per-
mits the presumption to be applied if “for the first two years of the child’s 
life, [the man] resided in the same household with the child and openly held 
out the child as his own.”419 Marriage is not a prerequisite to establishing a 
presumption of parentage under this section.420 Furthermore, the provision 
should be read in a gender-neutral fashion so as to be applicable to same-sex 
couples. As an illustration, in one case, a woman became pregnant while 
dating a man.421 She ended the relationship with the man and began a subse-
quent sexual relationship with another woman.422 The other woman was 
there when the child was born, and they remained in a relationship until the 
child was five years-of-age.423 At that time, the genetic mother ended the 
relationship with the woman and sought to prevent her from visiting with 
the child.424 In response, the other woman commenced an action under the 
state provision based on the Uniform Parentage Act.425 She argued that even 
though she had no genetic connection with the child, she should be consid-
ered a presumed parent, which entitled her to custody and visitation rights.426 
The court discussed the qualifications of a presumed parent under the Act 
and concluded that the essential ingredient is the alleged parent’s abiding 
commitment to the child.427 It is not necessary that the two adults share a 
common household or a commitment to each other, but it is necessary that 
the alleged presumed parent demonstrate a continuing commitment to the 
child’s well-being.428 Based on this test, the state appellate court remanded 
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the case to the trial court to make a determination of whether the non-
genetic person may be a presumed parent.429 
Another uniform act widely adopted is the Uniform Probate Code. In 
its most recent amendments, it has incorporated a provision that establishes 
parentage between a child of assisted reproduction and another individual 
who has “functioned as a parent of the child.”430 The code defines “function 
as a parent” as:  
[b]ehaving toward the child in a manner consistent with being the child’s 
parent and performing functions that are customarily performed by a 
parent, [such as] fulfilling parental responsibilities toward the child, rec-
ognizing or holding out the child as the individual’s child, materially 
participating in the child’s upbringing, and residing with the child in the 
same household as regular members of that household.431 
The person seeking parentage status must have functioned as a parent no 
later than two years after the child’s birth, or it must be shown that the two 
years were impossible to complete because of death, incapacity, or other 
circumstances.432 However, the better option under the Uniform Probate 
Code is for an individual seeking to function as a parent to have signed a 
written record evidencing a sufficient intent to do so.433 
Finally, the Uniform Probate Code provides for parentage to occur 
whenever a non-genetically related person is an “intended parent” to a 
child.434 This is defined as an “individual who entered into a gestational 
agreement that the individual will be the parent of a child born to a gesta-
tional carrier by means of assisted reproduction.”435 The provisions are oper-
able when an individual consents to the assisted reproductive procedure with 
the understanding that the resulting child will be the child of either or both 
of them.436 Obviously, the intended parent has no genetic connection with 
the resulting child but nonetheless intends to serve as a parent of that 
child.437 This procedure may be contemplated by same-sex partners seeking 
to become parents through assisted reproduction. Again, it broadens the 
possibility of parentage. 
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B. Worldview Response 
Persons and organizations advocating the worldview rely upon histori-
cal precedent, religious texts, and a moral law that is transcendent and im-
mutable. For these advocates, parentage that arises in contexts other than 
through sexual intercourse is considered an aberration. Conception through 
any means other than sexual intercourse would be viewed as a challenge to 
natural law. The Catechism of the Catholic Church illustrates the importance 
of the bond of sexual intercourse between married persons when it states: 
“The marriage covenant, by which a man and a woman form with each other 
an intimate communion of life and love, has been founded and endowed 
with its own special laws by the Creator.”438 Likewise:  
The origin of human life has its authentic context in marriage and in the 
family, where it is generated through an act which expresses the recipro-
cal love between a man and a woman. Procreation which is truly respon-
sible vis-à-vis the child to be born, must be the fruit of marriage.439  
In addition, if assisted reproductive technology resulted in the destruction of 
human embryos it would likely be considered abortion.440 Therefore, opposi-
tion to assisted reproduction will be on more than one level. 
Those persons discussing assisted reproductive parentage on an ethical 
level have concerns over fairness, equality, due process, and consistency in 
application. Specifically, commentators and cases have identified illustra-
tions involving genetic harvesting, marketing, cloning, and pursuit of de-
signer babies.441 Undoubtedly, developing technologies provide opportuni-
ties for unethical conduct. Opponents of assisted reproduction provide as an 
example the case of a California married couple who entered into a gestation 
contract with a surrogate that agreed to carry an embryo to term.442 The em-
bryo was the product of donor sperm and a donor egg.443 In the midst of the 
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surrogate’s pregnancy, the married couple divorced and informed the surro-
gate that they no longer wanted the baby she was carrying.444 When the baby 
was born the surrogate sought to relinquish the child, stating that she was 
not the parent, that the donors of the sperm and egg were not the parents, 
and that because the married couple—now divorced—had no genetic con-
nection with the child, they were not the child’s parents.445 The California 
trial court ruled that the baby had no parents.446 But on appeal, the appellate 
court reversed and held that the parents of the baby were in fact the two 
adult parties who initiated the process, and but for their conduct intending to 
bring about a birth, there would have been no birth.447 The appellate court 
reasoned that the case was analogous to when a husband consents to his wife 
being impregnated with the sperm of another man.448 The husband, although 
not genetically connected to the child, is the child’s parent because of his 
consent to the procedure. Intentionality was the element that established 
parenthood, not genetics.449 The case illustrates the ethical conundrums cre-
ated when adults have at their disposal technology, opportunity, and the 
financial resources to implement their desires.  
Ethical and religious worldview objectors can point to the fact that 
there are few regulations of fertility clinics or the people who use them.450 
One case provides an illustration.451 The issue concerned the disposition of 
seven frozen embryos stored in a Knoxville, Tennessee, fertility clinic.452 
While married, a man and a woman created seven cryogenically preserved 
embryos with the intention of one day using them to start a family.453 Sadly, 
  
 444. Id. 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. at 293–94. 
 448. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285–86. 
 449. Id. 
 450. See generally ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. §§ 101–1202 
(2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf; DEBORA L. 
SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF 
CONCEPTION (2006); Deborah L. Forman, When “Bad” Mothers Make Worse Law: A Cri-
tique of Legislative Limits on Embryo Transfer, 14 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273 (2011); 
Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determina-
tion of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Genetical-
ly Related Children: Harvesting Gametes From Deceased or Incompetent Children, 7 J. 
HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 147 (2011); Lisa M. Luetkemeyer. Comment, Who’s Guarding the 
Henhouse and What Are They Doing With the Eggs (And Sperm)? A Call for Increased Regu-
lation of Gamete Donation and Long-Term Tracking of Donor Gametes, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 397 (2010); Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective 
Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2283 (2007). 
 451. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 452. Id. at 589. 
 453. Id. at 591–92.  
2012] CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 79 
the couple filed for divorce, and the two former spouses were able to agree 
on all aspects of the dissolution with the exception of who would have “cus-
tody” of the seven embryos.454 The trial court determined that the embryos 
were human beings and awarded custody of them to the woman, with the 
right to use them to become pregnant.455 But the appellate court reversed, 
awarding the man and woman joint control so that a pregnancy cannot occur 
without the consent of both parties.456 The Tennessee Supreme Court then 
heard the case in an effort to establish parameters regarding reproductive 
technologies.457 
First, the court observed that the two parties never executed a written 
agreement for disposition of the embryos and that there was no state statute 
addressing the issue.458 In addition, there was, at the time, no established 
common law.459 Second, the court disagreed with the trial court, which ruled 
that the embryos were human persons.460 Instead, the court held that “they 
are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an inter-
im category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential 
for human life.”461 Third, the court focused on the privacy rights of the two 
adult parties, stating that this privacy right is grounded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, protecting them from “unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters such as . . . intimate questions of personal and family con-
cern.”462 Fourth, utilizing the authority provided by the decisions conferring 
on the adult the right to obtain an abortion at the start of any pregnancy, the 
court concluded that the privacy interests of the adult parties determines the 
outcome: “[T]he state’s interest in potential human life is insufficient to 
justify an infringement on the gamete-providers’ procreational autono-
my.”463 Based on these observations, the court affirmed the appellate court, 
holding that the relative interests of both adult parties must be balanced.  
Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assum-
ing that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving 
parenthood [by other means]. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, 
then the argument in favor of using the [embryos] to achieve pregnancy 
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should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the [em-
bryos] intends merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting 
party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail.464 
For advocates of a worldview that places strict limits on procreation 
and abortion, such cases offer a significant challenge. Some medical per-
sonnel working in a health care industry associated with assisted reproduc-
tion have refused to participate in some procedures, arguing that they have a 
First Amendment Free Exercise right to refuse involvement.465 For example, 
a 2008 California decision involved physician who refused to perform an 
intrauterine insemination (IUI) on a lesbian woman living with her female 
partner.466 The physician, employed at the North Coast Women’s Care Med-
ical Group, claimed that her sincerely held religious beliefs prevented her 
from personally performing the procedure.467 She suggested that there were 
other persons on the staff who would assist the patient.468 As the case devel-
oped it became apparent that this was not correct—there were no staff 
members capable of performing the procedure.469 This lack of service 
prompted the lesbian patient to sue the physician under the state’s Civil 
Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.470 
In spite of the physician’s Free Exercise argument, the court ruled that the 
physician would violate the Act if it could be proven that her refusal to per-
form the procedure was motivated by the sexual orientation of the patient. 471 
As was explained earlier, the ability of persons or organizations to suc-
cessfully assert Free Exercise exemption from laws of general applicability 
is nearly impossible following recent Supreme Court decisions.472 Instead, 
persons and organizations must seek protection in accommodation statutes, 
but these statutes are often so narrowly drawn as to make them unavailable 
to persons and organizations that do not meet strict guidelines.473 For exam-
ple, when California enacted the Women’s Contraception Equity Act in 
1999,474 which mandated that all employers in the state provide prescription 
contraceptives to its female employees, Catholic Charities, a major service 
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provider in the state, refused to comply.475 The Catholic organization argued 
that providing contraceptives to its employees would be a significant viola-
tion of its religious beliefs476 and argued that it had a right under the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause to refuse compliance.477 But the state 
court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause provided no immunity from the 
requirements of the Act.478 Then, Catholic Charities sought to be exempted 
from the Act through the state’s accommodation statute.479 The statute was 
narrowly drawn, requiring those seeking accommodation to, among other 
things, primarily employ persons of the same religious values, serve people 
who share the same religious values, and have as its primary goal the incul-
cation of its religious values.480 None of these three requirements were ap-
plicable to Catholic Charities; therefore, they could not find accommodation 
in the statute.481 Left with no alternative, Catholic Charities chose to self-
insure its employees, an arrangement that only the federal government, not 
state government, regulates.482 
To avoid state mandates that contraception be provided for all employ-
ees, many religious organizations that could not find an exemption in the 
accommodation statutes became self-insuring employers.483 This seemed an 
ideal solution to the employer’s refusal to violate its religious beliefs. None-
theless, the federal government enacted a health care provision that would 
eliminate the possibility of self-insuring employees.484 In 2010, newly enact-
ed federal health insurance permitted the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) to mandate requirements in accordance with the purposes 
of the federal legislation.485 Subsequently, in August 2011, the federal de-
partment mandated that all employers provide “coverage of sterilization and 
abortion-inducing drugs and devices as well as contraception.”486 Because 
DHHS was mandating contraceptive coverage, it effectively removed the 
option of self-insuring that had allowed religious organizations to avoid 
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state mandates and still offer health care coverage to its employees.487 There 
were a significant number of self-insuring religious employers since approx-
imately twenty-eight states mandated contraceptive coverage.488 Now, as a 
result of DHHS’s mandates—requiring contraceptive coverage at state and 
federal levels—religious organizations cannot find exemption through self-
insuring their employees.489 As discussed in reference to the California deci-
sion involving Catholic Charities, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause will not insulate religious organizations from mandated coverage.490 
Thus, “our schools, hospitals and charitable organizations will be placed in 
the untenable position of choosing between violating civil law and abandon-
ing our religious beliefs.”491 
There is a long tradition of federal accommodation of religious beliefs 
in implementing laws. Some of these laws specifically provide protection 
from forced involvement in contraception or sterilization.492 Addressing the 
challenges posed by same-sex marriage, Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson 
argues that  
legislative accommodations in medicine offer a number of approaches 
for resolving the clash between those who want a service and those who 
have moral objections to performing it. Many conscience clauses insulate 
providers from suit by patients, others from coercion by the government 
itself. Some provide unfettered discretion to refuse, while others provide 
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an exemption only when it poses no hardship to the individual requesting 
the service.493  
The rules issued by DHHS offer only a narrow accommodation, the same 
accommodation provided in California and illustrated in the state’s supreme 
court decision mandating that state employers provide similar contraceptive 
coverage.494  
To be eligible an organization must meet four strict criteria, including the 
requirements that it both hire and serve primarily people of its own faith. 
Catholic schools and hospitals would have to eject their non-Catholic 
employees, students and patients, or purchase health coverage that vio-
lates their moral and religious teachings.495 
Accommodations in statutes as narrowly drawn as the one in California 
would offer little solace to worldview providers that seek to serve all, not 
only those selected by similar faith convictions. Arguably, however, making 
the accommodation so limited serves to make the laws neutral as to religion. 
But by denying a religious accommodation to those that may claim a denial 
of Free Exercise, although minimal, the law is guaranteeing to all the right 
to equal treatment under the law. Those who can muster their political forces 
to enact specific accommodation statutes have the right to do so.  
It is reasonable to assume that there will be an increasing number of 
challenges made to a worldview that maintains a strict approach to issues 
such as marriage and parentage. Same-sex marriage will proliferate domes-
tically and internationally. Technological advances will continue in respect 
to assisted reproduction; therefore, even if states meet the challenge of 
providing better regulation of fertility clinics, ethical and moral concerns 
will persist. The true challenge to worldview proponents is reformulating the 
issues so that the impetus does not lie with private-ordering. Instead, the 
issues must be formulated in such a way to create a preference for the values 
that lie behind the historical, philosophical, and religious approaches to mar-
riage and procreation. Then the political process will benefit from an enliv-
ened debate and a more productive resolution. But worldview proponents 
must reeducate its adherents to bring about a political solution, whether it is 
one of accommodation or one of reestablishing a preeminent worldview.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This is not an article about religious liberty. Rather, it is an article 
about the evolution of family law that has precipitated challenges to 
worldview, which encompasses religion. Family law has evolved from a set 
of local laws and practices to an international amalgamation of state, federal, 
and international laws and treaties. As a result, American culture is no long-
er grounded in local communities but is increasingly drawn into an interna-
tional conglomerate of ideas, practices, and beliefs. Both developments have 
occurred in part because of the electronic milieu of the Internet. As a result 
of expanding internationalization, the governing culture does not necessarily 
support and enforce the values of a locality. Instead, politicians and the laws 
they enact often operate within the confines of strict neutrality, treating each 
individual person and organization in a neutral fashion so as to avoid dis-
crimination and to promote acceptance. Within this milieu of neutrality, the 
private-ordering of individual citizens has taken shape and flourishes. Its 
progress has been nourished by a series of Supreme Court decisions begin-
ning with the right to privacy announced in Griswold in 1965 and, most 
recently, with the right to individual liberty established in Lawrence in 2003.  
The culture of private-ordering has prompted state and federal legisla-
tures to enact certain family law initiatives that have had significant impact 
upon worldview practices defining form families for centuries. With the 
adoption of no-fault divorce in the latter part of the 1960s, either party could 
file for divorce, regardless of fault, and dissolve a marriage in a manner far 
easier than previously. If marriage could be dissolved so easily, then the 
definition of marriage could change—evolve—to include persons of the 
same sex. Following from this, no longer would sexual intercourse within 
the confines of marriage be the sole means of parentage. Parentage may 
result from an increasing number of adoption possibilities, including adop-
tion by single persons, same-sex couples, and opposite-sex couples, whether 
married or not. Indeed, the options of parentage expanded radically with the 
technological advances introduced by assisted reproductive technology. A 
person, single or not, could parent a child without any genetic connection 
with the child, either during that person’s lifetime or even after death 
through posthumous conception. These possibilities of adoption and assisted 
reproductive parentage are significant developments for advocates of a 
worldview, offering alternatives to a worldview based on history, natural 
law, and religious observance. When these possibilities are mandated and 
codified by secular political action, there is a challenge to worldview advo-
cates and, impliedly, to religious liberty. Inevitably, government will in-
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creasingly define religion and what is religious, “so that only the most rigid 
and separatist groups are exempt” from government regulation.496 
When challenged by government initiatives, religious persons and or-
ganizations have sought exemption from compliance through recourse to the 
First Amendment’s guarantee of free exercise of religion. Religious accom-
modation was necessary to insulate the beliefs of religious adherents so that 
they could continue to practice their beliefs without governmental restraints. 
But because the beliefs involved action, there was little respite in the First 
Amendment because of the judicial dichotomy established by decisions such 
as Reynolds. In that early 1878 decision the Court held that government 
could regulate actions, and any Free Exercise claim was restricted to beliefs 
only. The effect of this decision and others like it was to permit religious 
practitioners to believe anything that they wanted, but these practitioners 
had to act in conformity with the law of the land, even though the law may 
pose a significant obstacle for believers. Arguments abound stating that this 
dichotomy approach is the only logical one; otherwise the law would be-
come a patchwork of exceptions based on religious beliefs.  
A short period of protection for religious persons and organizations 
arose in 1963. In that year the Supreme Court held in Sherbert that state 
statutes would have to demonstrate a compelling state interest if they in-
fringed on the free exercise rights of claimants. This offered religious per-
sons and organizations a respite from the strict neutrality of Reynolds. But 
the respite was short-lived. In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Smith that 
the state was not required to demonstrate a compelling state interest. All that 
was required was that the law not be directed towards any one particular 
religion. The ruling in Smith revived the applicable test established in Reyn-
olds, the separation of belief and actions. Significant changes in the laws 
pertaining to divorce, marriage, adoption, and parentage challenge propo-
nents of religious beliefs advocating a worldview based, in addition to reli-
gious texts, on historical practice and natural law principles. Today, reli-
gious proponents are no longer insulated by the Sherbert holding, and often 
their views cannot overcome the state’s rational basis for the law.  
The vast majority of the laws infringing on Free Exercise provide that 
worldview adherents are forbidden from performing an action. For instance, 
polygamy was forbidden, and recently, states have enacted statutes forbid-
ding discrimination against those who are most likely to enter into same-sex 
marriages, who seek to utilize assisted reproductive technologies, or who 
wish to hire or fire persons solely on religious beliefs. Recently, govern-
ments have sought to compel religious persons and organizations to do 
something in compliance with rational government initiatives. Instances 
would include compelling religious adoption agencies to permit adoption by 
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persons unacceptable to the religious beliefs of the agency. In addition, the 
government mandates that religious organizations provide contraception and 
abortion services to all employees or pay significant fines for not doing so. 
Another instance would include compelling religious ministers to reveal 
what was said in confidential and sacramental confessional situations. These 
instances further complicate the recourse allowed to persons and organiza-
tions seeking to insulate themselves under claims of Free Exercise. Reli-
gious persons and organizations seek recourse in accommodation statutes.  
Seeking accommodation for religious beliefs is necessary because it is 
no longer possible to insulate belief by requiring the state to establish a 
compelling interest for what it does. Requiring this higher level of proof was 
established in Sherbert but revoked in Smith. Also, accommodation is in-
creasingly necessary because of continuing challenges made to worldview 
positions. No-fault divorce initiated a significant change that has become 
international in application. But since the adoption of no-fault divorce, there 
have been additional challenges, such as same-sex marriage, protection of 
nonmarital cohabitation, expanding adoption rights for adopters, advances in 
assisted reproductive technology, and government mandates for reproduc-
tive rights such as contraceptive insurance coverage. The only recourse for 
worldview adherents is to participate in the political process with the goal of 
gaining broader constitutional protection or to enact specific accommoda-
tion statutes.  
An obstacle for worldview proponents seeking to enter the political 
arena is that oftentimes, the adherents of a worldview advocating resistance 
to private-ordering are themselves private proponents of private-ordering. 
Media communications have lessened the attractiveness and restraint of lo-
cal mores, thereby increasing the tendency to see the value of another’s per-
spective, another’s right to private-order his or her life. Among many of the 
religious organizations advocating a worldview based on religious texts and 
a natural law world order, significant changes have occurred during the 
same period when private-ordering was evolving. For instance, during the 
1960s, the Roman Catholic Church underwent a major transformation when 
it convened and implemented the Second Vatican Council. At the end of the 
Council, many significant changes were introduced throughout the Catholic 
world. There were many theological refinements, liturgy innovations, and 
implementations of a policy of inclusion rather than exclusion. But among 
the most significant features introduced was what Garry Wills, a Catholic 
commentator, called “the dirty little secret.”497 That is, “[i]t forced upon 
Catholics, in the most startling symbolic way, the fact that the church 
changes.”498 As occurred with the Loving decision and same-sex marriage, 
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the inclusion of change fostered a blurring of religious cohesiveness; this 
precipitated a loss of mass-identity, resulting in private-ordering among 
adherents. Thus, after the Second Vatican Council,  
The major feature of the new Catholic theology is its diversity or plural-
ism . . . . No longer is there one Catholic way to do theology; rather, plu-
rality of method and style has taken over. Coupled with freedom of in-
quiry, it constitutes the major trademark of American Catholic theology 
in the post-Vatican II era.499  
This was inculcated in the practice of Catholic adherents.  
The new theology emphasized the individual’s relation with Christ, 
sought the authentic meaning of the Scriptures, tried to recapture the 
spirit and simplicity of the liturgies of the primitive Church, and groped 
for an inclusiveness that made the Eucharist a shared meal, rather than a 
distant ritual on cold marble altars.500 
Developments in family law including divorce, marriage, adoption, and 
parentage, have precipitated a significant challenge to worldview adherents, 
and, by implication, religious liberty. What must worldview proponents do 
to address the challenge? Worldview adherents, including religious persons 
and organizations must regenerate their message. Any worldview that re-
sults from history, natural law principles, and is preached from pulpits 
throughout the world has something to offer society. 
There seems to be growing agreement that the country could better bal-
ance its commitment to individualism and self-expression with some 
shared standard of what is substantively, not just procedurally, decent 
and good and just, some external criterion of right behavior compelling 
enough, for example, to quell pornography and violence, to keep families 
together even during hard times, and to prevent parents from deserting 
their children.501 
Media communications must be utilized, and there must be a reinvigoration 
of the premises upon which the worldview relied. Change, private-ordering, 
and internationalism are here to stay and must be included in any worldview 
response. The point must be to regenerate the message so that worldview 
adherents will respect it enough to accommodate its liberty with adherence 
and then with statutory protection. Admittedly, Christian worldview adher-
ents, most of whom are Roman Catholic in the United States, are not a mi-
nority community. “[M]ost religious-liberty cases involve minority religious 
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groups seeking to be left alone to pursue holiness as they see fit, free from 
the baleful attention or coercion of the majority.”502 
The protection of religious liberty will not result from condemnation, 
denouncement or threats coming from worldview leaders, including reli-
gious prelates. As is evidenced in the Catholic Church, 
[adherents] still look to their Church for moral guidance, but they are 
searching for principles, not for rules. The traditional Catholic codebook 
of behavior was perfect for peasants fighting their way out of the bogs, 
and it worked well enough for second-generation immigrants on the first 
rungs of middle-class respectability . . . . [But Catholics] exercise control 
over their own lives in ways their grandparents never did. When they 
turn out by the hundreds of thousands to listen to and pray with the Pope, 
it is because they see him as a symbol of the authority and continuity of 
their religion, and proof of the workings of the Spirit and the power of 
changeless principles in an unsettled moral era. But not because they are 
prepared to obey him “on all matters,” as he occasionally demands.503  
Worldview accommodation, to include religious accommodation and the 
statutory protection proponents seek to insulate the message from the effects 
of private-ordering, will result from the regeneration of the message, well-
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